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Abstract 
 
Declines in property markets played a central role in the Great Financial Crisis. Off-
balance sheet financing activities, particularly securitisations, were used to fund higher 
volumes of bank lending, concentrated in real estate. In response to the current low 
appetite for securitisations, the European Union has proposed a new Securitisation 
Regulation, with the aim of restarting EU securitisation markets. This article explores the 
possible legal and economic significance of this Regulation and argues that the proposed 
approach to regulating securitisation is likely to be deficient. Instead of addressing flaws 
in the securitisation process through improved incentives ± ZKLFK , WHUP µSURFHVV-
IRFXVHG¶UHJXODWLRQ± regulation ought to concentrate on the excessive credit-origination 
which securitisation may facilitate. This is particularly relevant to housing bubbles, 
which in general are driven by over-optimistic expectations about future house prices, 
shared amongst lenders, borrowers and investors. Improving incentives in credit-channel 
widening structured finance when all parties are over-optimistic is unlikely to guard 
against future bubble formation. This is particularly relevant to the UK market in light of 
structural reforms to the UK banking sector (so-FDOOHG³ULQJ-IHQFLQJ´, which is likely to 
UHVXOWLQWRGD\¶VODUJHXQLYHUVDOEDQNVEHLQJFRQYHUWHGLQWo monoline mortgage lenders. 
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1. Introduction 
Real estate bubbles were at the heart of the 2007-2009 financial collapse.1 As the housing bubble 
burst ± first in the United States and then in Europe ± the losses that eventual falls in property values 
inflicted upon large banking groups resulted in enormous macroeconomic effects. In the U.S., 
property prices fell on average by 40 percent2; in the U.K., the figure was over 20 percent.3 Many 
households suffered extreme financial distress, including severe contractions in income and 
unemployment. Real estate assets comprise the largest part of the wealth of the household sector. 
Housing values are therefore key determinants of long-term economic performance and property 
booms are central to boom-and-bust cycles.4 As a result, turbulence in housing markets generally 
exerts significant macroeconomic effects.  
Assuming that rapid increases in asset prices (and especially real estate values) present a 
financial stability risk, the present low interest rate environment appears likely to produce further 
expansion of mortgage lending, fuelling what seems like an evolving asset bubble. It is therefore not 
surprising that the housing market has been at the heart of recent financial stability concerns.5  
                                                          
The author would like to thank participants at conferences and workshops at the University of Oxford, the 
Institute for New Economic Thinking, and the University of Manchester for valuable feedback. 
 
1
 Real estate prices had doubled in real terms in most Western jurisdictions in the years leading up to 2007. The 
S&P/Case-Shiller Home ,QGH[SURYLGHVGDWDSRLQWV FROOHFWHGPRQWKO\E\6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶VRQUHSHDW-sales 
house price for the United States. According to this index, between 1996 and 2007, real estate values increased 
by 135% in real terms. See http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-corelogic-case-shiller. UK house 
SULFHVDOVRGRXEOHGGXULQJWKHVDVQRWHGE\+DOLID[³'HVSLWHDIDOORIPRUHWKDQRQH-fifth between mid-
2007 and mid-2009, house prices increased by more in real (i.e. inflation adjusted) terms than in any other 
GHFDGHRYHUWKHODVW\HDUV«+RXVHSULFHVLQFUHDVHGE\GXULQJWKHSDVWGHFDGH´6HHHBOS, UK house 
prices doubled during the 2000s, HALIFAX PRESS RELEASE, (Jan. 27, 2010) < 
https://static.halifax.co.uk/assets/pdf/mortgages/pdf/Halifax-UK-House-Prices-Doubled-During-The-2000s-
27th-January-2010-Housing-Release.pdf>. 
2
 S&P CASE/SHILLER HOME INDEX, id. 
3
 NATIONWIDE BUILDING SOCIETY HOUSE PRICE INDEX, <http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house-price-
index/headlines>. 
4
 Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace (NBER Working 
Paper 14587, 2008). 
5
 In November 2016, the European Systemic Risk Board wrote to eight counWULHV¶ILQDQFHPLQLVWULHVLQFOXGLQJ
WKH8.WRZDUQRI³YXOQHUDELOLWLHVUHODWHGWRWKH>5HVLGHQWLDO5HDO(VWDWH@VHFWRULQ(8FRXQWULHVWKDWPD\EHD
direct or indirect source of systemic risk to financial stability, and may also have the potential for serious 
QHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKHUHDOHFRQRP\´6HHEUR. S<6¶0,& RISK BD., VULNERABILITIES IN THE EU 
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE SECTOR (2016) 2. This followed a statement in 2014 from the Bank of England 
Governor, Mark Carney, warning of excessive UK price rises. See Hilary Osborne and Angela Monaghan, Bank 
of England governor warns of a bubble as UK house prices rise 10.5%, GUARDIAN (Jul. 15, 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jul/15/ons-uk-house-prices-may-london>. See also Kate Allen and 
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Because property booms are financed generally through bank lending, regulatory efforts since the 
crisis to safeguard financial stability have focused on increasing bank capital levels to reduce the 
impact of losses on assets. In the EU6, these capital increases have been implemented through the 
Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV),7 based largely upon the Basel III Capital Accord.8 
CRD IV mandates, inter alia, higher levels of high-quality capital, new bank liquidity provisions, a 
leverage restriction, and significant corporate governance reforms. Regulators in the U.K have 
supplemented these reforms with further restrictions, including tighter leverage requirements9 as well 
as a wholesale review of the U.K financial regulatory structure.10 Moreover, in 2013, the UK 
Parliament passed legislation mandating structural reform of the banking sector.11 This legislation 
requires certain large universal banks which offer retail, commercial and investment banking services, 
to separate their UK retail operations from wholesale or investment banking activities. This so-called 
µULQJ-IHQFLQJ¶ LV GHVLJQHG Wo promote financial stability by ³PDN>LQJ@ LW HDVLHU DQG OHVV FRVWO\ WR
UHVROYHEDQNVWKDWJHWLQWRWURXEOH«>DQG@«LQVXODW>LQJ@UHWDLOEDQNLQJIURPH[WHUQDOILQDQFLDOVKRFNV
LQFOXGLQJ E\ GLPLQLVKLQJ SUREOHPV DULVLQJ IURP JOREDO LQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVV´12 Newly ring-fenced 
banks will be restricted in the range of activities they may engage in and the sorts of products they 
may offer to customers.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Anna Nicolaou, Global property bubble fears mount as prices and yields spike, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/7ba6556e-e28d-11e4-ba33-00144feab7de>; Merryn Somerset Webb, London 
property and the madness of the crowd, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/80e61830-
dbd8-11e5-98fd-06d75973fe09>. 
6
 Whilst acknowledging the referendum vote on UK membership of the EU has produced considerable 
XQFHUWDLQW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH8.¶VFRQWLQXHGDGKHUHQFHWR(8ODZWKLVDUWLFOHSURFHHGs on the basis that the 
UK remains compliant with EU law until the process of leaving the EU is complete. Moreover, it is almost 
inconceivable that, even if it chooses not to adopt the SR, the UK will not adopt legislation of its own which 
mandates simple securitisation in some form. To do so would place its financial institutions at a significant 
competitive disadvantage. 
7
 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity 
of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338. 
8
 BANK FOR I17¶1¶7/ S(77/¶0¶76, BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
BANKS (2011). 
9
 BANK OF ENGLAND, THE FINANCIAL POLICY C200,77((¶6REVIEW OF THE LEVERAGE RATIO (2014). 
10
 The Financial Services Authority was abolished by the Financial Services Act (2012) CH. 21. 
11
 See Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act (2013) CH. 33. Ring-fencing initiatives are also being pursued 
at the EU-level, although no substantive laws have yet been agreed upon ± see EUR. COMM., HIGH-LEVEL 
EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR: FINAL REPORT, chaired 
by Erkki Liikanen (2012). 
12
 JOHN VICKERS, THE INDEP. C200¶1 21BANKING: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2011) [hereinafter 
ICB] at 10-11. 
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These manoeuvres have coincided with efforts underway in the EU to promote the integration 
of EU capital markets. The centrepiece of this Capital Markets Union (CMU) project is a proposal for 
a new EU Regulation on Securitisation ³65´.13 In theory, by broadening the funding channels 
available to financial institutions, the SR will allow borrowers to gain access to a more diverse group 
of potential lenders and reduce investor dependency on local banks. In the case of Europe, prior to 
2008 EU securitisation supported approximately one fifth of total bank loans granted to households 
and non-financial corporations in the euro area. According to one estimate, the re-booting of EU 
VHFXULWLVDWLRQ PDUNHWV FRXOG JHQHUDWH EHWZHHQ ¼-150bn extra credit for firms and households, 
representing a 1.6% increase on current levels.14 Yet, despite its relatively strong performance, its 
reputation was severely tarnished by the crisis, and EU securitisation markets remain dysfunctional.15  
To tackle this, regulators intend to mandate strict qualifying criteria to act as control mechanisms over 
the securitisation process. The most significant aspect of the SR is that will provide for lower capital 
FKDUJHV IRU µVLPSOH WUDQVSDUHQW DQG VWDQGDUGLVHG¶ 676 VHFXULWLVDWLRQ LQVWUXPHQWV Only 
securitisations which comply with these criteria will be eligible for the STS label.  
As this article will explain, these regulatory developments may have significant financial 
stability implications. Securitisation technology was certainly a key supply-side change in the 
provision of credit preceding the real-estate bubble, as many banks, property companies and other 
financial intermediaries packaged up and converted their mortgage loans into tradable mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). In particular, as I shall outline, there is a dominant ³VWDQGDUGnarrative´ in 
relation to the pre-crisis practice of securitisation which suggests that it introduced distortions into the 
mortgage origination process, resulting in the origination of excessive levels of mortgage loans. 
Specifically, the charge goes that many of the loans underpinning MBS suffered a gradual 
deterioration in quality and creditworthiness, as incentives in the securitisation process ± essentially 
                                                          
13
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council laying 
down common rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and 
standardised securitisation, Brussels, 30.9.2015 COM(2015) 472 final 2015/0226 (COD) [hereinafter SR 
PROPOSAL] 
14
 ICB, supra note 12, at 11. 
15
 According to the Proposal, just 0.1% of EU AAA-rated MBS defaulted in contrast to 16% of US sub-prime 
MBS and 3% prime MBS. The figures for lower-rated MBS are even more divergent; just 0.2% of EU BBB-
rated MBS defaulted in contrast to 62% of US subprime MBS and 46% prime MBS. See SR PROPOSAL, supra 
note 13, at 3. 
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the originate-to-distribute model ± led mortgage lenders to discount potential losses from mortgage 
defaults because they would no longer be holding the relevant assets. Indicatively, for example, the 
U.S Financial Inquiry Commission concluded that:  
³:KHQRULJLQDWRUVPDGHORDQVWRKROGWKURXJKPDWXULW\± an approach known as originate-to-hold ± they 
had a clear incentive to underwrite carefully and consider the risks. However, when they originated 
mortgages to sell, for securitization ± known as originate-to-distribute ± they no longer risked losses if 
WKHORDQGHIDXOWHG´16  
According to the standard narrative, the incentives to originate poor quality loans were also 
exacerbated by excessive complexity in securitisation design which prevented adequate analysis of 
the underlying risks. In combination, these features of securitisation reduced market discipline 
considerably. On the basis of this diagnosis, future securitisation regulation should seek inter alia to 
reduce the incentives for poor loan origination, increase transparency along the securitisation chain 
and reduce complexity. Process design and regulation are crucial to this endeavour and as shall be 
demonstrated, it is evident that the SR has been drawn up in this way. I term this approach to 
securitisation regulatory design process-focused regulation. Process-focused regulation in this context 
is founded upon setting up rules and structures to maximise intra-party information exchange, and to 
ensure that risks are allocated at the outset of the relevant transaction(s). In theory, this will produce 
the most efficient outcomes possible.  
In this article, I argue that the approach to regulation in the SR is likely to be deficient in 
preserving financial stability. It DVVXPHVWKDWSURYLGHGPDUNHWDFWRUV¶LQFHQWLYHVDUHproperly aligned 
and information asymmetries minimised, the securitisation practice will deliver superior resource 
allocation with minimal risks to financial stability. Yet, as I shall explain, focusing on the process of 
securitisation ignores arguably its most significant dimension, which lies in its capacity to widen the 
                                                          
16
 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM¶N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
(2011) at VHHDOVR'H/DURVLHUH³7KHRULJLQDWH-to-distribute model as it developed, created 
perverse incentives. Not only did it blur the relationship between borrower and lender but also it 
diverted attention away from the ability of the borrower to pay towards lending ± often without 
recourse ± against collateral. A mortgage lender knowing beforehand that he would transfer (sell) his 
HQWLUHGHIDXOWULVNVWKURXJK0%6RU&'2VKDGQRLQFHQWLYHWRHQVXUHKLJKOHQGLQJVWDQGDUGV´6HHDE 
LAROSIÈRE GRP., THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU (2009), at 9. 
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credit channel during financial booms. Of course, these booms almost invariably turn to busts, 
particularly in property markets. Numerous systemic banking crises have originated from excessive 
lending in real estate markets and, given appropriate circumstances, securitisation may be a significant 
contributory because of the way in which it loosens credit and funding constraints. In light of the role 
of securitisation in amplifying the bank credit channel in mortgage lending, a better way of restricting 
the potential for housing bubbles would be to address the capacity of the credit channel to expand in 
boom times, rather than simply focusing on protecting investors in mortgage-related products.  
Indeed, the behavioural aspect of bubbles ± which the current approach to the regulation of securitised 
mortgage-finance largely ignores ± instead places the endogeneity of credit supply at the centre of the 
analysis.   
This article makes several novel contributions to the debate on mortgages and securitisation. 
First, it challenges the orthodoxy that the safeguards inbuilt to the process via the STS label will be 
sufficient to mitigate real estate-linked instability in the banking system. As shall be highlighted, the 
existing literature on the proposed SR approaches the issues on these terms, even where critiques are 
made of the instrument itself. I do not claim there are no flawed incentives in the securitisation 
process; there is compelling evidence that securitisation results in banks paying less regard to credit 
standards when making lending decisions.17 Naturally, lower credit standards can contribute to 
lending booms. Yet, as I shall explain, lower mortgage underwriting standards are not necessarily the 
product of moral hazard; indeed, the lending boom which prefaced the GFC was not entirely 
subprime-driven and banks suffered huge losses on both retained securitisations and their non-
securitised mortgage portfolios. So, whilst incentives may play a significant role in determining lender 
behaviour, real estate values are affected by forces on both the supply-side and demand-side of 
finance which ± almost invariably ± are linked to overconfident expectations of future house price 
rises. Crucially, these expectations afflict both borrowers and lenders. As I shall outline, this not only 
reduces the utility of the SR by framing it in terms of the protection extended to borrowers, but also 
means that reforming incentives along the securitisation chain does little to address financial stability 
                                                          
17
 GLRYDQQL'HOO¶$ULFFLD'HQL],JDQ	 Luc Laeven, Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the 
Subprime Mortgage Market 44 J. OF MON CRED. & BANK. 367 (2012). 
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concerns. Given the implications for financial stability from the collapse of real estate bubbles, the 
major challenge in regulating these booms is therefore in reducing the propensity of the banking 
system to allow these expectations to become self-fulfilling. 
Second, the article will highlight how, by limiting the activities that retail banks may engage in, 
measures such as ring-fencing may encourage excessive focus on particular areas of lending; 
particularly mortgage markets which are not capital intensive and, in some cases, benefit from explicit 
government guarantees.18 The forced conversion of large banks by the ring-fence, I argue, will likely 
result in a market dominated by monoline mortgage lenders. For reasons which shall be explained, 
this may not only contribute to future real estate booms but it will also leave banks even more 
exposed to the real estate cycle, the source of most recent banking crises in the UK (1973-75; 1991-
92; and 2007-09). As a consequence, there may be significant financial stability implications from 
ring-fencing; indeed, as Goodhart notes ³>W@KH OLNHO\ FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RI VXFK ULQJ-fenced banks on 
UHVLGHQWLDO PRUWJDJHV « ZRXOG OHDYH WKHP HYHQ PRUH H[SRVHG WR WKH KRXVLQJ F\FOH ZLWKRXW
GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ SRWHQWLDOLW\´19 I use empirical data on the UK banking system ± in particular on 
mortgage lending trends and the evolution of U.K. bank balance sheets since the GFC ± to 
demonstrate that U.K. banks have already begun to reposition their balance sheets in anticipation of 
the activity restrictions introduced under the ring-fence. Whilst this transition has been thus far 
gradual, the trend is clear. As will be explained, this will likely make ring-fenced institutions banks 
more predisposed to lending to property markets, and heighten their vulnerability to downturns in 
house prices. In light of the sectoral structural reforms on their way in the UK, the SR has the 
potential to widen this channel at precisely the time that large banks will become even more 
concentrated in property lending, by virtue of ring-fencing. Of course, securitising mortgage loans 
ZLOO UHGXFHEDQNV¶ H[SRVXUH WRSURSHUW\ PDUNHWV+RZHYHU DNH\ IHDWXUHRI WKHQHZ65 LV LWV ULVN
retention requirement, meaning mortgage risk will remain on their balance sheets. Moreover, as I shall 
                                                          
18
 The UK government offers explicit support to home buyers, providing a government guarantee for up to 20% 
of the value of a property by means of a five-year interest free equity loan. From 1st January 2017, the scheme is 
to be amended in two significant ways: (i) it will be available only to purchasers of new-build homes; and (ii) 
the equity loan amount that the government will guarantee for new build homes in London will rise to 40%. For 
further details, see <http://www.helptobuy.gov.uk>. 
19
 Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Vickers Report: an assessment, 6 LAW & FIN. MARK. REV. 32, at 33 (2012). 
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explain, rather than focusing on risk retention requirements ± which did little to prevent the 
concentration of mortgage risk during the GFC ± a better approach to regulation in the context of 
securitisation and housing bubbles is likely to be to limit MBS volumes to some degree. 
Third, the article shall also demonstrate how the securitisation of mortgages under the STS 
label will in theory allow banks to arbitrage new capital regulations which apply to higher-risk 
mortgage loans. Existing mortgage regulations, under Basel III, treat mortgage assets differentially, 
applying progressively higher capital requirements according to the level of equity in the secured 
property.  Securitisation allows assets of different risk profiles to be pooled and subsequently tranched 
into levels of varying credit risk. By converting lower grade assets into higher-grade securities of 
commensurately lower capital intensity, securitisation ± even in STS form ± will thereby contribute to 
higher lending capacity at banks and likely increased financial flows to property markets. As will be 
explained, there is a further potential loophole in the STS design which banks may arbitrage to reduce 
the capital charges which would normally apply to some of their riskier mortgage assets, further 
increasing those financial flows. 
On the basis of the analysis, the principal argument put forward is that the combination of 
securitisation with retail ring-fencing ZLOO OLNHO\ LQFUHDVH UDWKHU WKDQ GLPLQLVK ULVNV WR WKH 8.¶V
financial stability. The subject of mortgage securitisation has been discussed exhaustively in the 
academic literature. The possible consequences of ring-fencing in the context of mortgage markets 
have also been analysed, albeit in much less depth. To my knowledge, this article is the first that 
considers the possible consequences from each in combination. The core message of the article is not 
that asset securitisation is in of itself undesirable; indeed, rehabilitating securitisation markets is likely 
to be welfare-enhancing.20 I do not claim (unlike many other analyses) that securitisation of 
mortgages was a priori a cause of the financial crisis; instead, in the words of Foote et al., 
³VHFXULWL>V@DWLRQ PHUHO\ IDFLOLWDWHG WUDQVDFWLRQV WKDW ERUURZHUV DQG LQYHVWRUV ZDQWHG WR XQGHUtake 
                                                          
20
 Indicatively, researchers at the International Monetary Fund DUJXHG LQ  WKDW ³³3ODFLQJ SULYDWH
VHFXULWL]DWLRQ PDUNHWV EDFN RQ D ILUP DQG VXVWDLQDEOH IRRWLQJ KDV QHYHU EHHQ PRUH LPSRUWDQW«7KH WLPH KDV
QHYHU EHHQ PRUH ULJKW WR FRPSOHWH WKH WDVN RI >UHVWDUWLQJ@ VHFXULWL]DWLRQ´ Miguel Segoviano, et al., 
Securitization ± The Road Ahead (IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN15/01, Jan. 2015), at 4. 
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DQ\ZD\´21 However, it does not follow from this that securitisation played no role in the mortgage 
boom; it is clear that securitisation facilitated lending and helped drive real estate prices up. Its future 
use ± even in STS form ± therefore needs to be controlled if financial stability is to be preserved.  
The article proceeds as follows. The first section analyses the relationship between bank credit 
and the real estate cycle. The second section discusses securitisation as a funding technique and 
considers the recently proposed SR in the EU. This leads to the third section, which analyses the main 
drivers of housing bubbles, before highlighting arbitrage opportunities in the SR which may 
exacerbate these drivers. The fourth section outlines tKH 8.¶s ring-fencing proposals, before 
presenting novel data on U.K. bank lending and balance sheet composition to demonstrate that banks 
are already beginning to shift into mortgage lending in anticipation of the ring-fencing restrictions. 
The penultimate section discusses the existing macroprudential regulatory toolkit in the UK and 
discusses potential improvements in light of the preceding analysis. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Bank Credit & Real Estate Bubbles 
A consensus has developed that the lending behaviour of financial institutions, in particular banks, is a 
key driver of real estate booms. Important contributions to this debate suggest a link between bank 
lending policies and house prices. Most early analyses found this link was a reciprocal, mutually 
reinforcing relationship through which credit influences house prices, and house prices influence 
credit.22 For example, if property values increase thanks to demographic changes or monetary policy, 
homeowner equity in houses will be generated even in the absence of additional mortgage credit. 
These new higher collateral valuation may in turn be used to justify further borrowing, or to withdraw 
                                                          
21
 Christopher L. Foote, et al., Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of 
the Foreclosure Crisis (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Paper No.12-2, 2012) at 2. 
22
 Charles A.E. Goodhart & Boris Hofmann, House prices, money, credit, and the macroeconomy 24 OXF REV 
ECON POL 180, (2008) at 202. 
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home equity and increase borrower leverage.23 The concurrent increases in both house prices and 
mortgage credit amplify cyclical effects of lending. 
In recent years, a considerable number of papers have focused on the explicit impact of looser 
bank credit on house prices. In sum, these papers confirm that the effects are often unidirectional: 
aggressive credit pricing significantly increases real estate values. Researchers at the New York 
Federal Reserve, for example, show that the pre-GFC housing boom was the result of an increase in 
credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market. They base this conclusion 
on four empirical facts: (i) an unprecedented rise in home prices; (ii) the surge in household debt; (iii) 
the stability of debt relative to home values; and (iv) the fall in mortgage rates.24 Another, now-
classic, paper shows that over the period 2002 to 2005, metropolitan US subprime markets witnessed 
an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit despite falling real incomes and productivity. 
They show that house price growth was negatively correlated with income growth over the same 
period, implying that the positive change in house prices could result only from changes in credit 
supply.25 The authors attribute this to (i) supply-side changes in the provision of mortgage credit, 
particularly securitisation of mortgages; and (ii) expectations of higher house prices, which increased 
disproportionately in subprime localities. Other analyses show, inter alia, that: in areas of the U.S. 
where post-GFC mortgage loans had higher limits, house prices were higher relative to those areas 
where loan limits were lower, suggesting that the supply of credit increased house prices independent 
of other factors;26 easier access to credit through lower financing costs significantly increases house 
prices;27 relatively more liberalised bank mortgage lending regulations28 and removal of restrictions 
                                                          
23
 Kosuke Aoki et al. House prices, consumption and monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach, 
mimeograph (2014).  
24
 Alejandro Justiniano et al., Credit Supply and the Housing Boom (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Report 709, 2015). 
25
 Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage 
Default Crisis 124 Q. J. ECON. 1449 (2009). 
26
 Edward Kung, The Effect of Credit Availability on House Prices: Evidence from the Economic Stimulus Act of 
2008 (unpublished manuscript) available at 
<https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2015/retrieve.php?pdfid=412>  
27
 Manuel Adelino et al., Credit Supply and House Prices: Evidence from Mortgage Market Segmentation 
(NBER Working Paper No. 17832, 2012). 
28
 Giovanni Favara & Jean Imbs, Credit Supply and the Price of Housing, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 958 (2015). 
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on lending29 lead to larger house price increases; and increased elasticity in credit supply terms leads 
to higher real estate values.30 In sum, these contributions suggest that the lending activities of banks 
may exert significant effects on the value of real estate.  
Banking has also become progressively more focused on real estate lending, which of course 
amplifies the financial stability consequences of real estate crashes. Arguably the most significant 
paper in recent years in the context of bank lending composition and real estate is by Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor.31 They disaggregate bank credit for seventeen advanced economies since 
1870. Their analysis produces three particularly important findings: (i) the sharp increase of credit-to-
GDP ratios in advanced economies since the 19th century is largely a result of rapid growth in 
mortgage loans to the household sector, which also explains the marked change in bank balance sheet 
composition; (ii) real estate credit is a particularly significant factor in predicting financial fragility; 
and (iii) ³ILQDQFLDOFULVLVUHFHVVLRQV´DUHVLJQLILFDQWO\ZRUVe than other forms of recession and these 
recessions are heavily influenced by mortgage credit. These findings confirm those in the study by 
Reinhart and Rogoff, who show that in advanced economies there is always a significant run-up in 
housing prices prior to a financial crisis, and that the fallout from housing crises causes relatively 
more economic damage than other forms of crisis.32 Mian and Sufi find similar conclusions: that the 
expansion and bursting of private credit booms concentrated in aggressive mortgage lending growth 
may create significant financial instability.33 House price upswings associated with higher household 
indebtedness produce costlier recessions.34 The additional leveraging that accompanies housing 
booms of course exacerbates financial dislocations and makes recovery more difficult.35 Considering 
the importance of property lending to contemporary retail and commercial banking, efforts to 
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 Marco Di Maggio & Amir Kermani, Credit-Induced Boom and Bust (Col. Bus. School Research Paper No. 
14-23, 2015). 
30
 Elliot Anenberg et al., The Effect of Mortgage Credit Availability on House Prices and Construction: 
Evidence from a Frontier Estimation Approach (Nov. 2015) available at 
<http://people.stern.nyu.edu/ahizmo/ahkm.pdf>   
31
 Òscar Jordà et al., The Great Mortgaging: Housing Finance, Crises, and Business Cycles (NBER Working 
Paper No. 20501, 2014). 
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 Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An 
International Historical Comparison, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 339 (2008). 
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 ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT (2014). 
34
 Mathias Drehmann, et al., Anchoring countercyclical capital buffers: the role of credit aggregates (Bank for 
IQWHUQDW¶OSHWWOHP¶WV Working Paper No. 355, Nov. 2011). 
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 J.V. Duca et al. Housing markets and the financial crisis of 2007±2009: Lessons for the future 6 J. FIN. STAB. 
203 (2010). 
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ameliorate the instability characteristic of the banking system must take into account both the property 
cycle and the contribution of banks to the phases of that cycle. 
 
3. Securitisation and Mortgage Markets 
The securitisation of mortgage loans played a particularly prominent role in developments in 
mortgage finance markets in the run-up to the crisis.36 As noted in the introduction, its role has been 
analysed extensively. The process involved in basic securitisation is straightforward (although at more 
esoteric levels, the process may become extremely complex). Once issued, loan assets (known as the 
µUHIHUHQFH SRUWIROLR¶ are pooled and transferred to a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle 
(SPV), legally organized as a trust, which finances its purchase of the assets through the issuance of 
securities. The investors receive fixed or floating rate payments funded by the cashflows due from the 
reference portfolio, which are generally collected and transferred by the originator, for a servicing 
fee.37 The creditworthiness of the securities is rated by external agencies, whilst credit enhancements 
and/or guarantees from the sponsor may also be granted to the SPV. The securitisation is often sliced 
into segments, or tranched, which allows issuers to create securities with a subordinated structure. 
This results in security classes with different orders of priority for payment, each of which has a 
sliding scale of associated risk. The least risky tranche (the senior level) has first call on the income 
generated by the underlying assets. The lower levels (mezzanine, junior and equity) are riskier, and 
suffer losses first. The equity slice is normally the smallest tranche but bears the highest risk.  
The securitisation process thereby allows the conversion of lower-grade individual financial 
products into higher-grade securities. For example, structured finance products may convert a 
portfolio of BBB-rated products into a security with AAA-rated senior tranches.38 This facilitates the 
redistribution of risk amongst different classes of investor; in particular, it allows institutional 
investors to hold assets indirectly which regulations would ordinarily deem too risky. From the 
                                                          
36
 Daniel Awrey, Toward a supply-side theory of financial innovation 41 J. C203$5$7¶9( ECON. 401 (2013). 
37
 Andeas A. Jobst, What is Securitization? 45 J. FIN. & D(9(/¶3¶0¶17 48 (2008). 
38 During the period 1990 to 2006, the average percentage of corporate bond issues with AAA-rating was 9%. 
For securitisations, it was 75%. Asset-backed securities (including MBS) accounted for 64% of the growth of 
long-term bonds over the same period. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JOINT FORUM 
REPORT ON ASSET SECURITISATION INCENTIVES (2011). 
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perspective of originators, securitisation fulfils four purposes: funding diversification, regulatory 
capital and accounting benefits, risk transfer, and revenue generation.39 The empirical literature 
suggests that banks place most stock in the first two of these benefits.40 Securitisation facilitates low-
cost financing as it allows financial institutions to raise cash against illiquid assets. Securitising assets 
also allows financial institutions to reduce their capital requirements.41 In the case of mortgage assets 
with identical capital requirements but different risk profiles, for example, the originator could raise 
its risk level without facing any increase in its capital charge by holding the riskier asset on balance 
sheet and removing the assets with lower risk. This allows banks to fund new or existing loans by 
securitizing them rather than holding them to maturity.  
Although mortgage securitisation was not new (dating back to the 1970s), the scale it reached 
prior to the GFC was unprecedented. For example, the private market for MBS stood at $1.2 trillion 
in 2006 in the US alone (this excludes agency-sponsored securitisations, the largest source). Some 80 
percent of mortgages which were issued over the five-year period prior to the GFC were pooled and 
securitised or combined with other asset-backed securities to form collateralised debt obligations 
µ&'2V¶ and sold on in secondary markets to other financial institutions.42 Mortgage securitisation 
volumes in the U.K were smaller, although they experienced significant annual growth in the years 
OHDGLQJ XS WR  H[SDQGLQJ IURP YLUWXDOO\ ]HUR LVVXDQFH LQ  WR RYHU ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ 
representing 54% of all European MBS issuance.43 Indeed, securitised funding of mortgages in the 
U.K. reached 18% of UK mortgage credit by 2007.44 
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 See Id. 
40
 For discussion of this literature, see id. Appendix I. 
41
 Securitized assets are funded by outside investors (investors in the SPV) rather than the bank itself. The SPV 
is financed through investors buying securities in the SPV who are then entitled to the receivables (contractual 
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capital arbitrage and to improve return-on-equity. 
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 See Jeremy C. Stein, Securitization, shadow banking & financial fragility, 139 DAEDALUS 41 (2010). 
43
 FIN. SERV. AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS (2009) at 14. 
44
 John Kiff et al. µ(XURSHDQ VHFXULWLVDWLRQ DQG WKH SRVVLEOH UHYLYDO RI ILQDQFLDO LQQRYDWLRQ¶ LQ THE FIRST 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE 21ST CENTURY PART II, JUNE-DECEMBER 2008 (Andrew Felton & 
Carmen M. Reinhart eds., 2011) at 119-122. 
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The Proposed EU Regulation 
 
The aim of the SR is to provide a framework for the re-introduction of securitisation and securitised 
products to the market. Several bodies were involved in drafting advice and guidance for the draft 
Regulation, including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE).  
The SR will apply to any lender or originator of assets ± ³W\SLFDOO\DFUHGLW LQVWLWXWLRQ´45 ± 
which may engage in the practice of securitisation. STS-compliant securitisations will qualify for 
more generous (risk-sensitive) capital treatment. The Proposal lays down strict guidelines on STS 
criteria. The STS must comprise only homogenous asset types and cannot itself be comprised of 
securitisations (³re-securitisations´).46 Any exposures included must be originated in the ordinary 
FRXUVH RI WKH RULJLQDWRU¶V EXVLQHVV DQG any material change in underwriting standards must be 
disclosed to investors.47 Representations and warranties as to the creditworthiness of the underlying 
exposures must be provided by the originator.48 Strict rules on the creditworthiness and recent 
financial performance of borrowers must be complied with.49 Synthetic securitisations are also 
excluded.  
Responsibility for compliance with the criteria lies with originators, sponsors (with oversight 
from the European Securities and Markets Authority) and investors. Because of a perception that 
faulty credit ratings assigned to structured finance contributed to the crisis, the use of credit ratings as 
a proxy is not encouraged. Supervisory and cross-border oversight and sanctioning is also outlined, as 
well as rules on transparency50, and due diligence and risk retention.51 As shall be explained, risk 
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 SR PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 2. 
46
 See id. Art. 8(4)-(5) 
47
 See id. Art. 8(6) 
48
 See id. Art. 8(2) 
49
 See id. Art. 8(7). 
50
 See id. Art. 5. Originators, sponsors and conduits ought to make information freely available to investors on 
standardised templates, on websites which meet criteria on control of date quality and business continuity. 
51
 See id. Art. 4. Originators, sponsors and original lenders are already required to retain some level of risk under 
existing legislation (for example under the Capital Requirements Regulation or Alternative Investment Fund 
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retention is regarded as an especially important tool, because in theory it aligns the interests of 
originators and investors. Under the initial Proposal, the minimum risk retention requirement ± the 
portion of the securities that the originator must retain ± was 5 percent. However, at the time of 
writing, this level was under negotiation and it is very likely that it will be raised in the final version 
of the SR.52 STS securitisations must be rated in two ways: internally, under the Basel III Guidelines 
for securitisations53 and externally, by credit ratings agencies (for regulatory and investor purposes). 
As with capital requirements relating to general products, securitisations may be rated through 
internal models (Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA) or External Ratings-Based Approach 
(ERBA)) or through the standardised approach (SA). The assessment of credit quality of a 
securitisation comprises quantitative elemHQWVSDUWLFXODUO\LQUHODWLRQWRµH[SHFWHGORVVHV¶FDOFXODWHG
QRUPDOO\ WKURXJK µ9DOXH DW 5LVN¶ 9D5 DQGRU µ3UREDELOLW\ RI 'HIDXOW¶µ/RVV *LYHQ 'HIDXOW¶
(PD/LGD) methodologies), and qualitative elements, such as an assessment of the regulatory 
environment.  
 
Process-focused regulation 
Before the GFC, securitisation was widely regarded as financial stability-enhancing, because it 
allowed for the dispersal of credit risk to a broad and diversified range of investors.54 In the event, of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Manager 5HJXODWLRQEXWWKHEXUGHQRIFKHFNLQJWKLVULVNUHWHQWLRQKDVKLWKHUWRODLQZLWKLQYHVWRUVWKHµLQGLUHFW
DSSURDFK¶7KHFXUUHQW3URSRVDO WKHUHIRUH LQFOXGHVD direct risk retention requirement, as well as a reporting 
requirement on the originator. 
52
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market plan REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016) available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-markets-regulations-
idUKKBN13X18X>.  
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54
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Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity and the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit, Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit (5 
Nov. 2003), 108th Congress, First Session. 
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course, instead of diversifying risk these risk management techniques increased homogeneity, thereby 
resulting in the entire financial system being exposed to fluctuations in the market for MBS.55  In spite 
of this, post-GFC regulation of the securitisation market focuses on regulating the mechanics of the 
securitisation process. This is based largely upon lessons drawn from the standard narrative of 
securitisation and the GFC discussed above; namely the possible distortion in incentives that the 
originate-to-distribute process creates. According to McCoy, Pavlov and Wachter for example:  
³:LWKRXWUHJXODWLRQVHFXULWL]DWLRQDOORZHGPRUWJDJHLQGXVWU\DFWRUVWRJDLQIHHVDQGWRSXWRIIULVNV
During the housing boom, the ability to pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for 
market share by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing. Lenders who did 
not join in the easing of lending standards were crowded out of the market. Artificially low risk premia 
caused the asset price of houses to go up, leading to an asset bubble and breeding fraud. The 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIOD[OHQGLQJZHUHWKHUHE\FRYHUHGXS´56  
Characterising the problem of mortgage securitisation in this way gives rise to several possible 
responses. One perspective regulators adopt regarding regulating securitisation is process-focused: 
that is, they assume that provided that the risks from the securitisation process are minimised through 
efficient incentive structures and disclosure techniques, securitisation is less likely to pose financial 
stability issues. The rational investor model assumes that investors have an unlimited capacity to 
process information to account for risk within their portfolios, provided they are protected from fraud 
and information is made freely available.57 In accordance with this view, the STS criteria discussed 
above largely address the problem via the lens of investor protection ± that provided full and frank 
disclosure of the material risks attendant to data concerning securitised products are made available, 
and incentives for obfuscation reduced, distortions flowing from the securitisation process may be 
mitigated.  
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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In contrast, the Proposal adopts a rather benign view of the financial stability implications of 
increasing volumes of asset securitisation. Instead, as noted in the introduction, it points to the relative 
historical stability of the European securitisation market and the safeguards built in to the STS 
Proposal which will help mitigate concerns about complexity and risk management posed by non-
standardised securitisations. Indeed, most post-GFC research on securitisation approaches the issue on 
these terms, offering critiques on the securitisation process, the incentives embedded within it, and 
new regulations designed to safeguard the integrity of the process. Schwarcz, for example, discusses 
the limitations and tradeoffs of both the Dodd-Frank Act58 (DFA) in the U.S. and the EU SR in the 
context of re-establishing a global securitisation market.59 He contends that the emphasis on STS in 
the SR will also mitigate one of the main impediments to risk management in financial markets 
populated by cognitively-bounded agents; namely, complexity.60 Indeed, thanks to its emphasis on 
simplicity, Schwarcz concludes that the STS framework JRHV ³D ORQJ ZD\ WRZDUGV DGGUHVVLQJ
FRPSOH[LW\ DV D FDXVH RI PDUNHW IDLOXUH´61 and that the US authorities might consider a similar 
approach to regulation. Whilst more critical of the SR instrument, Bavoso argues along similar lines: 
in particular, contending that the SR fails on three main counts in safeguarding investor interests: (i) 
because of the reliance placed on rating agencies in the securitisation process; (ii) a failure to fully 
enunciate the criteria for STS; and (iii) potential ambiguities in the STS definition.62  
Approaching the issue of securitisation from this process-focused perspective yields certain 
analytical benefits. It is clear for example that the securitisation process may be subject to several 
forms of incentive distortion. These distortions are thought to prevent the efficient pricing of asset-
backed securities. When an originating lender securitises its mortgages loans, those loans are removed 
from its balance sheet and sold to outside investors, in theory insulating the lender from mortgage 
defaults caused by falling house prices. Because of this, there are supply-side incentives to originate 
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lower-quality mortgages, as the originating bank or mortgage lender knows that the credit risk of the 
loans will be passed down the securitisation chain and they will therefore be largely shielded from 
losses on the original loans (termed WKH ³KRW SRWDWR´ WKHRU\ by Shin63). In all likelihood, this will 
affect aggregate mortgage underwriting standards and in tandem increase the flow of credit to the 
mortgage market, helping to push up prices. This is sustainable only if standards are relaxed, meaning 
the issue of moral hazard becomes critical. Levitkin and Wachter argue the advent of the private 
securitisation market in the U.S. in particular helped amplify this dynamic via complexity in private 
securitised products and information asymmetries between originator and MBS investors which 
allowed overinvestment in MBS and boosted ILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶SURILWV64  Importantly, of course, 
WKLVYLHZDVVXPHVWKDWWKHUHZLOODOZD\VEHD³JUHDWHUIRRO´LQWKHVHFXULWLVDWLRQFKDLQXSRQZKRPWKH
eventual loss will fall. According to scholars such as Schwarcz and Bavoso, protecting investors by 
establishing a more systematic securitisation framework will ameliorate the effects of these poor 
incentives and restore faith in the securitisation process. Ceteris paribus, the primary purpose of 
regulation of securitisation ought to be to mitigate the distorting incentive effects at its heart. 
At one level, these arguments are certainly convincing. A good proportion of the studies into 
the progressive decline in mortgage lending standards, for example, appear to provide evidence for 
the view that the originate-to-distribute model encouraged poor lending decisions by originating 
banks and mortgage lenders.65 As noted earlier, many regulatory reports into the GFC based their 
conclusions on the flawed incentives theory and it is therefore to be expected that any regulation 
appertaining to initiatives to restart securitisation markets are framed in this way. However, the 
standard narrative ± that securitisation as a supply-side phenomenon caused the real estate bubble 
thanks largely to poor incentives and excessive complexity ± is based upon a very narrow view of the 
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lending dynamic which inflated it.66 This is not to denigrate the contributions of scholars who 
approach the regulation of securitisation from a process-focused perspective; after all, reducing 
complexity and information asymmetry in securitisation markets is likely to be welfare-enhancing. 
Yet, because the precise nature of the contribution of securitisation to the GFC has been distorted, 
recent regulatory prescriptions to mitigate possible externalities from securitisation are also likely to 
be flawed. 
 
:HDNQHVVHVLQWKH³VWDQGDUGQDUUDWLYH´ 
 
The standard narrative RI VHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH FULVLV has become extremely potent, 
informing significant swathes of post-crisis regulations. This has occurred despite its foundations 
being weak. To be valid, the standard narrative must be logically consistent with the following claim: 
that investors were duped by sophisticated lenders who systematically originated poor loans and used 
WKH0%6DVµFRYHU¶WRUHPRYHULVNIURPWKHLUEDODQFHVKHHWV± after all, why would anyone purchase 
MBS which contained dud mortgages or mortgages which were designed to fail? Further, if this was 
indeed the case, the empirical record would demonstrate that MBS originators ± knowing their 
products were in reality stuffed full of junk ± would attempt to remove as many of the destructive 
loans as possible from their balance sheets to prevent them suffering losses when the mortgages 
comprising the MBS failed. Yet, as I shall now explain, neither of these claims stands up in light of 
both information theory and empirical data on mortgage securitisation practices (and, importantly, 
where MBS losses eventually fell). 
Take the case, for example, of the mandatory risk retention requirements enshrined in both 
DFA and the SR. The standard narrative claims that underwriting standards appear to have declined in 
the run-up to the GFC, with many claiming this provides evidence that moral hazard engulfed the 
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securitisation process.67 Risk retention (or ³VNLQ-in-the-JDPH´) in the tradition of classic asymmetric 
information theory advocated by Akerlof,68 is a tool to counteract this moral hazard. In the case of 
mortgage securitisation, lenders have access to superior information than MBS investors about the 
quality of loan portfolios underlying the MBS, but without any economic interest in the MBS, they 
lack incentives to screen out risky loans.  If the original lender retains some economic interest in the 
product, this signals to the market that the loans in question are creditworthy and mitigates adverse 
selection problems. In the context of mortgages, without any equity retention on the part of the issuer, 
the loan originator would have no incentive to adequately monitor the loans comprising the MBS, and 
the result would be too many risky mortgages. Superficially, therefore, a risk retention requirement 
help avoid these problems. 
Yet, as noted by Bubb and Krishnamurthy, a mandatory risk retention requirement may not be 
useful, as this requirement is founded upon a fundamental misreadLQJRI$NHUORI¶VWKHRU\69 Akerlof 
argued that in cases where buyers cannot observe the same level of information about a product as 
sellers (i.e. there is asymmetric information), the expected response would be for the buyer to adjust 
their price downwardsWRUHIOHFWWKHSRWHQWLDO³OHPRQ´ULVN,PSRUWDQWO\WKLVLVEHFDXVHWKHEX\HULV
aware that the product in question may suffer from a defect of which she has no information. If the 
problem becomes serious enough, market failure may ensue: investors will not be able to distinguish 
the quality of the securities offered on the market, and will therefore assume the worst possible 
quality. The equilibrium price for all the securities subsequently would drop based upon this quality 
assumption and offerors of good securities would withdraw from the market, reducing trading 
liquidity.  
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In the case of the pre-GFC MBS market, however, this explanation is at odds with the 
standard narrative of the incentive problem propounded by many researchers. This account claims 
instead that information asymmetry about the quality of mortgages allowed sophisticated securitisers 
to increase the volume of trade in the MBS market by exploiting uninformed MBS investors and 
VHOOLQJ WKHP ³OHPRQV´ By implication, the story assumes that mortgage securitisers were able to 
consistently and systematically trick investors into purchasing MBS stuffed with mortgages likely to 
GHIDXOW%XWWKHILUVWSULQFLSOHLQ$NHUORI¶VWKHRU\LVWKDWEX\HUVknow about the incentive problems at 
the outset. This will reduce their willingness to trade and lower prices, leading to less trading, not 
more.70 If this occurs, the standard response would be for market participants to voluntarily contract 
for risk retention. The lemons problem is mitigated by the market through the following means: the 
reputation of the arranger; the arranger providing a credit enhancement71 to the securities or retaining 
risk; or any due diligence conducted by investors.72 Consistent with this, a recent study shows that 
investors charged a lower premium for their investment in MBS vehicles affiliated with the mortgage 
originator(s) than those with no connection, showing that the market, at least in part, priced and 
structured MBS to reflect incentive alignment.73  
The imposition of standardised risk retention also ignores considerable empirical evidence 
ZKLFK EHDUV RXW $NHUORI¶V WKHRU\ concerning both common contractual provisions between 
securitisers and investors and the underlying mechanics of the securitisation industry. First, as 
predicted by Akerlof¶V WKHRU\, credit risk retention was, in fact, extremely common in the 
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securitisation process prior to the GFC. According to Schwarcz, an experienced securitisation lawyer, 
³WKHPDUNHWLWVHOIKDVDOZD\VPDQGDWHGULVN-UHWHQWLRQ´74 This is confirmed by empirical data: all but a 
handful of U.S. securitisers retained substantial portions of MBS. Goldman Sachs, for example, 
retained 70 percent of its issued MBS volumes; Merrill Lynch 91 percent.75 Many banks also offered 
explicit funding guarantees to off-balance sheet vehicles, thereby insuring outside investors against 
losses: Acharya et al document that at least $1.3 trillion of assets were securitized and guaranteed in 
this fashion.76 Banks and other financial institutions also held MBS either as inventory for their MBS 
fee-earning business lines or because bank capital regulation favoured the retention of securitised 
products. At the Swiss bank UBS, for example, management increased significantly the securitisation 
of mortgage assets, and at the same time, the bank began to retain a large proportion of MBS on its 
balance sheet.77 It is surely inconceivable that banks retained large holdings of assets which they knew 
to be toxic. Further, institutions in jurisdictions in which the originate-to-distribute model was not 
particularly popular (for example, Ireland) ± and KHQFH KDG ³VNLQ LQ WKH JDPH´ ± also experienced 
significant losses, suggesting that ³poor loan origination standards were more critical than the 
originate-to-distribute model in DQGRILWVHOI´78  
Thus, whilst the motivations for banks holding MBS on their balance sheets are plural, the 
data appears inconsistent with the view that banks and other securitisers foisted large volumes of 
poorly-underwritten loans on to unsuspecting and naïve investors. Instead, banks and other 
securitisers were themselves heavily exposed to downturns in the housing market, and the associated 
drops in the values of MBS. The aggregated losses on mortgage-related assets at the ten worst-hit U.S. 
lenders approached $150 billion.79 U.K banks cumulatively lost over £170 billion, much of this 
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through their trading books, which were heavily invested in MBS markets.80 A more persuasive 
explanation therefore appears to be that, in boom times, asset prices are not always precise indicators 
of risk-levels. The voluntary retention of huge volumes of MBS by securitisers is strong evidence for 
this. Indeed, it shows that MBS were not viewed by the market as high-risk; in fact, most of the MBS 
products purchased by banks which eventually turned toxic were low-yield, low-risk securities. It also 
meant that many mortgage-related assets were highly correlated ± in effect, because the risks they 
posed had been underestimated.81 
These findings are supported by a very important piece of recent research on the composition 
of real estate loan defaults. According to the standard narrative, after exhausting the supply of 
creditworthy mortgage borrowers, banks and mortgage lenders began to make increasingly risky loans 
in order to maintain lending levels and profits. In doing so, they used securitisation as a technique to 
hide true levels of risk from investors.82 Yet, Adelino, Schoar and Severino provide convincing data 
which refute two expected conclusion from these popular beliefs; namely, that mortgage loans were 
increasingly made to subprime and poor borrower in the U.S. in the lead up to the GFC, and that 
defaults in the U.S. were concentrated in those groups. On the contrary, they show that mortgage 
originations expanded at all income levels and credit scores prior to the crisis, and that defaults by 
middle-income, high-income and prime borrowers all increased sharply. This is fully consistent with 
the demand-VLGH QDUUDWLYH ZKHUH KRPHEX\HUV DQG OHQGHUV HDFK ³ERXJKW LQWR LQFUHDVLQJ house 
YDOXHV´83 5DWKHU WKDQ ORDQVEHLQJRULJLQDWHG WRERUURZHUV ³DW WKHPDUJLQV´ WKH FULVLVZDVEURXJKW
about by mortgage lending to borrowers across the entire income distribution: the share of mortgages 
issued to subprime borrowers remained constant during the lead-up to the GFC. More importantly, the 
share of delinquencies suffered by those borrowers dropped significantly during the crisis.84 This of 
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course undermines the notion that subprime lending encouraged distorted credit allocation which 
resulted in securitisations filled with poor loans. Instead, it shows that the mortgage bubble was 
inflated as a result of excessive lending to all groups.85 When considered together, these findings 
place obvious limits on the view that correcting flawed incentives in the MBS market will prevent 
future housing bubbles.  
 
4. A More Holistic View: Over-optimism, Housing Bubbles and Securitisation 
The facts presented above demonstrate that the proposed regulation of securitisation under the SR is 
unjustifiably focused on a narrow view of market failure. Process-focused regulation may be followed 
religiously, and yet financial instability arising from securitised banking may still arise, if nothing is 
done to constrain bank lending to particular asset markets. In this context, many contributions ignore 
the wider financial stability issues posed by expectations-based housing booms, and pay little 
attention to the role(s) securitisation may play in amplifying these dynamics.  
As I shall now explain, in the context of securitisation, rather than relying on regulating the 
processes involved, in general regulation must also take account of the behavioural biases that propel 
real estate lending booms. Specifically, in this context the regulation of MBS ought to be predicated 
on the notion that overly optimistic (and sometimes irrational) beliefs about real estate values are the 
main drivers of housing booms. These booms of course may morph into bubbles, and eventual 
crashes, with severe consequences for financial stability. Because securitisation contributes to 
additional lending potential at financial institutions, its credit-widening dimensions arguably need to 
be addressed through targeted financial regulations, something I discuss later in the article. 
Over-optimism and Real-Estate Booms 
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Why would investors speculate on asset prices to the extent that the market value of those assets 
eventually crashes? The central driver is that these processes are driven by over-optimism.86 In his 
seminal work, Shiller claims bubbles are XVXDOO\SURSHOOHGE\µQHZ-HUD¶WKLQNLQJDIUDPHRIUHIHUHQFH
ZKLFKSXVKHVSHRSOHWREHOLHYHWKDWIXWXUHPDUNHWSURVSHFWVDUH³EULJKWHURUOHVVXQFHUWDLQ´87 than in 
past periods.88 Importantly, it affects not only borrowers confident of ever-increasing prices, but also 
lenders and investors.  
The process of asset overvaluation which causes financial crashes is linear: enthusiasm for 
particular assets leads to short or medium term increases in their price, which cannot usually be 
justified objectively from available economic data. Instead, near-term memories of strong 
SHUIRUPDQFH OHDG WRDQ LQFUHDVH LQSULFHVZKLFKDWWUDFWV IXUWKHU LQYHVWPHQW³7KHKLJKGHPDQG IRU
>DQ@DVVHWLVJHQHUDWHGE\WKHSXEOLF¶VPHPRU\RIKLJKSDVWUHWXUQVDQGWKHRSWLPLVPWKHKLJKUHWurns 
JHQHUDWHIRUWKHIXWXUH´89 This enthusiasm for these assets becomes a self-reinforcing cycle as other 
market participants are drawn to invest by the returns available.90 Where agents possess 
heterogeneous beliefs concerning the future path of asset markets, a preponderance of confidence 
amongst those agents will lead to increased asset prices, even where this confidence may be 
misplaced.91 7KH IODZHGPHPRULHV FHQWUDO WR WKLVSURFHVVPD\DOVR FRQWULEXWH WR µGLVDVWHUP\RSLD¶
that is, an underestimation of the likelihood of an adverse shock.92 In benign markets with very little 
recent history of negative events agents, boundedly-rational agents with flawed memories may 
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underestimate low-probability, high risk events, and take on greater exposures than an objective 
probability assessment would warrant.93  
In the case of the housing market, excessive optimism may encompass banks, securitisers and 
µVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶0%6LQYHVWRUV94 If agents underestimate the default risk of mortgages, a boom-bust 
period in debt and real estate prices becomes likely.95 Moreover, increasing housing prices raise the 
market value of the collateral securing mortgage loans. This lowers the risks of mortgage financing 
for lenders and, if they are optimistic about future real estate values, they will be more willing to lend 
for house purchases. In the case of the recent housing boom, the probability of a housing price crash 
was heavily discounted. Survey evidence shows that buyers in the housing market held extremely 
optimistic views concerning real estate values, right up until the crash.96 There is evidence of similar 
sentiments amongst investors; analysts at Lehman Brothers and JP Morgan assigned negative housing 
market performance very low probabilities; the latter well into 2007.97 Foote, Gerardi and Willen 
provide evidence that investors understood the risks attached to MBS and the real estate market and 
that the risk assessments done by some securities investors were accurate in their loss predictions.98 
Indeed, mortgage securitisation experts themselves did not see the crash coming ± increasing rather 
than decreasing their exposure to the mortgage market ± despite having superior data to average 
investors on the housing market.99 
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Significantly, the information which implied house price falls and the losses these would 
cause was available; in fact, many investors made substantial returns from shorting institutions 
exposed to the housing market.100 In the event, after rising consistently from 1997 to 2005, house 
prices in the US stopped rising in 2006, and fell in 2007. Yet, credit default swap spreads on financial 
institutions which traded heavily in the MBS markets were not affected until mid-2007 and did not 
widen substantially until later that year.101 This suggests that investor sentiment regarding the real 
estate market ± and those institutions trading in the MBS market in the US ± remained irrationally 
positive in spite of the information available.  
The sentiments described were not confined to investors in the U.S. market. In relation to the 
U.K., for example, research conducted just prior to the time that the housing bubble burst in the UK 
suggests that house prices were overvalued by as much as 25 percent, with a large portion of that 
distortion driven by (optimistic) expectations.102 As in the US, loose financing terms were 
prevalent.103 Increasing volumes of credit were extended to borrowers, often only on the basis of 
confidence in future real estate price rises; QR FROODWHUDO µ]HUR GHSRVLW¶ PRUWJDJHV ZHUH
commonplace, which are  only worth issuing if the lender (or MBS investor) is confident that property 
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prices will continue to rise. If one examines the individual bank failures in the U.K. during the GFC, 
all were attributable to some degree to excessive optimism concerning property markets. In the case 
of RBS, for example, its difficulties derived mostly not from investment banking, but from traditional 
retail lending.104 Similarly, Northern Rock¶s losses resulted mainly from it ratcheting up its residential 
mortgage loans (lending the most in its history in the first half of 2007), gambling on increasing 
residential home values.105 HBOS suffered huge losses on its commercial real estate portfolio.106 
Bradford and Bingley¶V107 failure and the near-collapse of the Co-Op bank108 were also driven by 
significant increases in retail mortgage lending, with little-to-no role in causing losses for complex 
investment products.  
Based on these observations, it is surely inconceivable that amongst such a spectrum of 
lenders, each of which suffered large losses on its retail loan book, optimism about future real estate 
values did not dominate. Moreover, the data cannot be easily reconciled with a theory of flawed 
incentives. Instead, mortgage borrowers, lenders, MBS securitisers and investors, each appear to have 
consistently underestimated the likelihood of a property crash. On this basis, one authoritative study 
concludes WKDW³DQDO\VWVJHQHUDOO\XQGHUVWRRGWKDWIDOOLQJSULFHVZRXOGKDYHGLVDVWURXVFRQVHTXHQFHV
but assigned that outcome a low probability ... Our bottom line is that the problem largely had to do 
ZLWKH[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWKRPHSULFHV´109 
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Tackling bubble-investing 
According to the analysis above, the failure of investors to correctly price risks in asset markets ± 
especially those experiencing boom-like conditions ± places hard limits on the ability of process-
focused regulation to maintain financial stability. Whilst the explicit function of securitisation 
regulation is not to tackle asset bubbles per se, the omission of the SR to address the possibility of 
impacts on real estate from STS securitisations may be costly to financial stability, based upon the 
contribution of securitisation to lending booms.  
Take the case, again, of mandating risk retention in securitisation (or other forms of 
financing) as a primary risk management tool. Under the assumption (of this article) that a 
preponderance of market participants, including lenders and borrowers, in a bubble responds in the 
same way ± with over-optimism ± risk retention requirements will not guard against over-lending to 
property markets. For example, even if mortgage lending standards dropped in the run-up to the crisis, 
and originators were reaching ever lower down the credit spectrum as the boom evolved, it is 
established that mortgage securitisers were aware of these deteriorations.110 If securitisers were 
parcelling off all mortgage risks from their portfolios to outside investors, then this could be 
interpreted as consistent with the moral hazard argument. But as discussed above, securitisers retained 
huge portions of MBS on their own balance sheets, or in remote SPVs to which they provided 
guarantees. This behaviour is difficult to reconcile with the moral hazard/poor incentives 
explanation(s).  
When framed in this way, the analysis reveals that lenders themselves may underestimate the 
risk of failure ± a classic facet of the bubble process. Importantly, the proposed SR fails to pay any 
heed to this perspective. In turn, this has produced gaps in regulatory analysis and reduced the utility 
of some recommended mechanisms to regulate securitisation, particularly risk retention. Mandating 
the retention of large slices of mortgage risk in large financial institutions in all probability will not 
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cure systemic risk, but simply amplify it.111 One of the extolled benefits of securitisation is to 
diversify risk away from financial institutions; rather than loans staying on the books of a few large 
originators, credit risks may be spread across a wider pool of investors. Paradoxically however, the 
risk retention requirements under the SR are likely to concentrate mortgage risk in the financial 
system on the balance sheets of large mortgage originators and large securitisers.112 This critique may 
to a lesser degree also be applied to such mechanisms as increased transparency requirements, 
heightened disclosure or the use of credit ratings agencies. As with the risk retention requirement, 
each of these measures proceeds from the same premise: that investors need to be protected in the 
securitisation process from the distorted incentives securitisers face;113 thereby marginalising the 
significance of other risks from securitisation, particularly the credit expansion it facilitates. 
Thankfully, a good deal of recent research recognises the problem that securitisation of loans 
creates in widening the lending channel and the consequent effects on the housing cycle.114 
Securitisation results in lower borrowing costs for originators and removes financial frictions, 
allowing institutions to fund new debt more quickly.115 The existence of a liquid secondary market for 
                                                          
111
 $VQRWHGE\7XUQHU³,WZDVDUJXHG WKDWVHFXULWLVHGFUHGLW LQWHUPHGLDWLRQFRXOGUHGXFH ULVNV IRU WKHZKROH
banking system, since while some of the credit risk would be held by the originating bank and some by other 
banks acting as investors, much would be passed through to end non-bank investors. Credit losses would 
therefore be less likely to produce banking system failure. But that is not what happened. Because when the 
PXVLFVWRSSHG«WKHPDMRULW\RIWKHKROGLQJVRIWKHVHFXULWLVHGFUHGLWDQGWKHYDVWmajority of the losses which 
arose, did not lie in the books of end investors intending to hold the assets to maturity, but on the books of 
highly leveraged banks and banklike institutions. The new model left most of the risk still somewhere on the 
balance sheets of banks and bank-OLNH LQVWLWXWLRQVEXW LQDPXFKPRUHFRPSOH[DQG OHVV WUDQVSDUHQW IDVKLRQ´
6HH$GDLU7XUQHU7KH(FRQRPLVW¶V,QDXJXUDO&LW\/HFWXUH-DQXDU\ 
112
 Bubb and Krishnamurthy (n 69) 1580-81. 
113
 The Securitisation Regulation ProposDO IRU H[DPSOH VWDWHV WKDW LWV DLP LV WR ³UHVWDUW D VXVWDLQDEOH
securitisation market that will improve the financing of the EU economy, while ensuring financial stability and 
LQYHVWRUSURWHFWLRQ´:KLOVW LWKDVRQ WKHVXUIDFHDGXDOPDQGDWH³HQVXULQJILQDQFLDOVWDELOLW\´ LV UHGXFLEOH WR
SXWWLQJ ³LQ SODFH D PRUH ULVN-VHQVLWLYH UHJXODWRU\ IUDPHZRUN´ ,Q IDFW WKH SURSRVDO LPSOLHV ORZHU FDSLWDO
requirements for the same volume of assets. This is, at best, financial stability-neutral. On the other hand, the 
majority of the amendments referred to in the Proposal are directed at heightened protection for investors in 
securitisation. See Proposal (n 13) 1.5.1. 
114
 7KH &RPPLVVLRQ LWVHOI QRWHV WKDW ³6HFXULWLVDWLRQV DUH DQ LPSRUWDQW FRQVWLWXHQW SDUW RI ZHOO-functioning 
financial markets insofar as they contribute to diversifying institutions' funding sources and releasing regulatory 
capital which can then be reallocated to support further lending´ 6HH 3URSRVDO IRU D 5HJXODWLRQ 2I 7KH
European Parliament And Of The Council amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements 
for credit institutions and investment firms Brussels, 30.9.2015 COM(2015) 473 final 2015/0225(COD) (1). 
115
 Shin, amongst others, argues that the expansion in MBS issuance between 2002-2007 was a supply-side 
SKHQRPHQRQ GULYHQ E\ ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ DSSHWLWH IRU QHZ DVVHWV WR XVH IRU VKDGRZ EDQNLQJ DFWLYLWLHV
,QGLFDWLYHO\KHDUJXHVWKDW³WKHVXESULPHFULVLVKDVLWVRULJLQLQWKHLQFUHDVHGVXSSO\RIORDQV± or equivalently, 
in the imperative to find new assets to fill the expanding balance sKHHWV´6HH6KLQ Q 331. See also VV 
Acharya, T 3KLOLSSRQ05LFKDUGVRQ15RXELQL µ7KH)LQDQFLDO&ULVLVRI-&DXVHVDQG5HPHGLHV¶
31 
 
mortgages decreases the capital constraint on originators; banks which are able to sell the loans they 
originate may redeploy that capital immediately to fund new loans. Securitisation markets also 
increase liquidity by providing new funding sources outside the banking system. The tranching 
process creates highly-rated assets out of riskier loans, allowing institutions which are in general 
restricted by regulation to purchasing securities of investment-grade to channel pools of savings into 
different asset classes: 
In a traditional banking system that intermediates between retail depositors and ultimate borrowers, the 
total quantity of deposits represents the obligation of the banking system to creditors outside the 
banking system. However, securitisation opens up potentially new sources of funding for the banking 
system by tapping new creditors.116 
These savings would normally be directed towards safer assets such as government debt but may 
instead find their way into asset-backed securities, including MBS.117 As such, this may result in 
significant volumes of finance flowing into an asset market with relatively inelastic supply.118 
This facet of securitisation was pronounced in relation to mortgage lending before the crisis. 
Each time banks sold bundles of loans via securitisation, the liquidity obtained allowed them much 
greater capacity to lend. These new loans could themselves be securitised, and so on, resulting in a 
large expansion in the credit multiplier, as the banking sector piled up new mortgage assets. Post-
crisis research by Loutskina VKRZVWKDWEDQNV¶KROGLQJRI liquid assets declined by over 7 percent in 
the period 1976-2007. She isolates the effects of securitisation on this contraction, and finds it is 
equivalent to roughly 69% of bank capital. In other words, the shrinkage in liquid assets indicates a 
comparable increase in loans. Securitisation therefore increases the relative supply of loans per unit of 
capital.119 On this basis, other research shows that, when isolated, the effects of securitisation pre-
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2006 in the U.S. contributed approximately 30 percent to the pre-GFC peak of mortgage debt.120 
Ohlrogge and Giesecke suggest that the rise in subprime mortgage lending was fuelled partially by the 
rapid increase in private mortgage securitisation.121 There is also strong evidence of a similar effect in 
Spain, where extensive mortgage securitisation took place.122 
 
Securitisation and capital regulation arbitrage 
 
I turn now to the capital arbitrage dimension which may be feasible under the SR. I have already 
referred to the fact that when an institution securitises its assets and removes them from its balance 
sheet, it reduces its capital charge. This is a primary motivation for securitisation of assets. The SR, of 
course, is designed explicitly to provide preferential capital treatment for STS-eligible securitisations. 
However, the effects of the widening of the lending channel facilitated by securitisation are likely to 
be amplified by the fact that the proposed rules under the SR as currently conceived will allow 
additional capital regulation arbitrage. This secondary arbitrage opportunity is indirect, and is based 
upon the asset composition of the STS securitisations themselves. Arbitraging regulations is of course 
a fundamental functions of financial innovation123, of which securitisation is a prime example. Yet, 
arbitrage may have financial stability consequences; in the case of capital arbitrage, particularly the 
additional lending capacity it affords banks. As , VKDOO H[SODLQ WKLV µOD\HULQJ¶ RI DUELWUDJH
opportunities, in common with the liquidity benefits from securitisation just discussed, presents a 
further incentive for banks to securitise their assets and thereby increase mortgage lending. 
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The Mechanism 
As detailed above, in order to be eligible for the STS-label, the securitisation in question must satisfy 
certain criteria. If the securitisation complies with these criteria, the capital requirement is reduced 
accordingly. The STS may be rated using any of the methodologies outlined earlier (the SA, ERBA or 
IRBA). It is to be expected that almost all of the largest banks, and certainly all of those in the UK, 
will adopt the IRBA approach to rating securitisations. Under the IRBA, the SR, as proposed, contains 
some safeguards to guard against imprudent lending and errors in risk modelling. It stipulates that a 
risk weight floor for all securitisation exposures of 15%, for all three approaches, except for senior 
positions in STS securitisations, which may be reduced to 10% in certain circumstances.124 It also sets 
certain limits on individual exposures between institutions125 and restricts use of the STS label where 
authorities can show that an STS has highly complex or risky features.126 
Because the regulations exclude securitisations populated by heterogeneous assets from being 
designated STS, it is to be expected that future securitisations will become standardised in terms of 
asset type. The European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2015 recommended additional impositions on 
the definition of STS, so that credit risk could be further mitigated.127 For example, following EBA 
advice, STS cannot be comprised of fully-guaranteed residential mortgage loans, and no STS assets 
may have a residual maturity of more than three years.128 Beyond these restrictions however there is 
little in the IRBA to prevent the construction of wide asset portfolios from the same type of asset(s) 
but with radically different risk profiles. Through this, the STS instrument is open for use as an 
arbitrage device. The proposal, for example, is silent on the capital treatment of mortgages which do 
not comply with the criteria for standardised treatment under Basel III. Under Basel III, banks which 
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use the Standardised Approach129 to capital regulation must apply a minimum risk weight of 35% to 
retail mortgage exposures. However, a significant restriction on the weighting calculation is that any 
mortgage which exceeds 80% of the value of the secured property will be weighted at 75%, with this 
higher weighting applied to the excess of any mortgage over the 80% threshold.130 If held on-balance 
sheet, therefore, higher loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages ± at least under the SA to risk weighting ± are 
capital intensive. 
Yet these requirements do not apply to securitised assets under the SR. There is nothing to 
prevent banks from originating a larger proportion of higher-risk mortgages than they would absent 
the capacity to securitise them, because through the securitisation process, they may be combined 
with higher-quality mortgage loans to produce securities which will not require the same level of 
capital as a high-risk mortgage which remains on-balance sheet. There are just two substantive 
restrictions in the Proposal relating to MBS composition: (i) any residential mortgage exposure where 
the LTV is above 100% is excluded from qualifying as underlying assets under the STS label; and (ii) 
the average LTV of the underlying mortgage pools when aggregated must be equal to or less than 
80%.131 This will allow banks to combine mortgages of high-LTVs with those with lower LTVs and 
still take advantage of the preferential risk treatment available under the STS label.  
The following example is instructive (for simplicity, I use the risk weights designated under 
the Basel III Standardised Approach applied to on-balance sheet residential mortgage-related 
exposures): 
1. Assume a bank with a mortgage portfolio consisting of 10 individual mortgage assets 
of equal loan size. The total value of the portfolio is £1 million, comprised of the 
following: 5 mortgages with 50% LTV ratios, and 5 mortgages with 100% LTV 
ratios. Each mortgage loan therefore totals £100,000; however, the capital treatment 
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differs due to the differing LTVs applied to each mortgage loan. Those loans with 
50% equity attract a risk-weighted capital charge of 35%, resulting in a total capital 
requirement for the issuing bank for each individual mortgage of £2800 (£100,000 x 
35% x 8%). The loans with 100% LTVs each attract higher capital requirements, 
thanks to the additional proportional capital requirement imposed by virtue of those 
LTVs being above the 80% ratio. This results in capital charge of £3440 per 
individual loan ((£80,000 x 35% x 8% = £2240) + (£20,000 x 75% x 8% = £1200)). 
On average, therefore, the capital required per individual loan across the portfolio is 
£2920 ((£2800 x 5) + (£3440 x 5) / 10).  
 
2. If securitised, of course these loans would attract lower capital charges; this is a major 
function of securitisation.132 Provided banks are able to construct securitisations 
which do not exceed the limitations on composition described above (so, with an 
aggregate LTV of 80% or less amongst the mortgage assets involved), these assets 
will be eligible for STS-treatment. In the example given above, the aggregate LTV is 
75%. Accordingly, a STS-MBS could be constructed from the constituent elements 
described above. The total capital charge for senior traches of this STS could be as 
little as £8000 (depending upon the rating assigned) as opposed to £29200 (£2920 x 
10) in the aggregate for on-balance sheet mortgage loans.  
 
In other words, the STS instrument will allow banks to benefit not only from reduced capital charges 
IRU³JRRGTXDOLW\´DVVHWVEXWLQDOORZLQJWKRVHDVVHWVWREH combined with lower quality exposures, 
the total capital requirement may be reduced accordingly.133 7KLVZLOOQRWGLUHFWO\DIIHFWEDQNV¶FDSLWDO
requirements based on the securitisation instrument. However, it will incentivise them to issue a 
somewhat higher proportion of riskier assets at the outset by securitising them and combining them 
                                                          
132
 According the BCBS, capital requirements of senior securitisation exposures backed by good quality pools 
will be subject to risk weights as low as 10%. See BCBS (n 53). 
133
 There were reports that the upcoming incarnation of the Basel Accord might apply risk weight floors to 
internal modelling for mortgages. However, it appears that these mooted reforms will not be implemented. 
36 
 
with less risky assets. In other words, not only does the SR provide for lower capital charges for STS-
compliant securitisations (which is partly its function anyway) but it will allow banks to arbitrage the 
additional capital requirements reserved for the riskiest mortgages, provided that they the relevant 
MBS is structured in a way which qualifies it for a reduced capital charge. 
The only safeguard in place to prevent combinations of this type becoming excessive is the 
ratings system (either internal- or external-based) which will determine the relevant risk-weighting. 
Both the Capital Requirements Regulation and Basel III Securitisation Framework134 apply a 
spectrum of ratings to securitised products, known as credit quality steps.135 Rating from credit rating 
agencies are also important elements in this process. Where MBS are comprised mainly of high-risk 
or high-LTV mortgages, this ought to be picked up during the ratings process, and the security be 
penalised as such with a higher risk-weighting, assuming rating methodologies are accurate. Yet, the 
lamentable performances of the ratings and risk-weighting processes prior to the GFC do not augur 
well for disciplining devices of this type; criticisms abound that they remain highly-flawed in 
particular, internal-modelling approaches (which will be used by the largest banks in the UK in 
determining capital requirements).136 0RUHRYHURIFRXUVHWKHµPDJLF¶RIVHFXULWLVDWLRQLVWKDW highly-
UDWHGLQWKHYHUQDFXODUµWULSOH-$¶UDWHGSURGXFWVPD\EHFUHDWHGIURPORZHU-quality assets. The STS-
criteria may be effective in preventing some of the more egregious structured-financing techniques of 
the pre-crisis period but STS securitisations will invariably be rated more highly in sum than their 
constituent parts.  
Of course, even where this does not guarantee high ratings for some securitisations, the 
overall effect of the SR is bound to widen the lending channel. Assuming that the securitisation in 
practice assumes the features of the portfolio in the above example, but in MBS markets the structure 
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is replicated many times (in other words, the actual MBS comprises thousands, not tens, of 
mortgages) this will facilitate a much larger flow of finance available for investment in property 
markets. Whilst this may not place these securitisation themselves significantly more at risk of default 
(as noted previously, most EU securitisations did not default at all over the crisis period), by helping 
European banks to arbitrage Basel III capital regulations, it will potentially expand the credit supply 
channel. As noted above, this is not a theoretical argument; excessive securitisation pre-crisis was not 
dangerous simply because of the (allegedly) poor incentives embedded in the process but because it 
facilitated greater lending into a market prone to rapid and large losses in value. Lowering bank 
capital requirements indirectly through the STS mechanism thereby has the potential therefore to 
widen bank lending to property markets, which is likely to amplify the housing and mortgage cycles.  
 
5. Ring-Fencing and the UK Mortgage Market 
Previous sections have explained how housing bubbles may form, and have described the contribution 
securitisation may make to their formation. They have made clear that regulating securitisation from a 
process-focused perspective, exemplified by the STS instrument, will do little to assist in preventing 
their re-emergence. Yet, there is an additional reform due to be implemented in the UK which also has 
the potential to exacerbate real estate bubbles: ring-fencing. In this section, I analyse how ring-fencing 
legislation, which is due to be implemented fully in the UK in less than two years, is likely to 
exacerbate these concerns. Specifically, the structural changes made to the banking sector under the 
UK legislation, in combination with the adoption of some version of the SR, is likely to 
simultaneously widen the lending channel to property markets at the same time that banks become 
less diversified and position their balance sheets toward real estate lending. As this section will show, 
this is a trend which is already discernible in relation to the asset composition of the largest UK banks, 
which has the potential to add fuel to any fire in UK property markets. These observations, in light of 
the likely widening of the credit channel under the SR, may pose financial stability risks as mortgage 
lending becomes increasingly important to the business models of ring-fenced institutions. Further 
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regulation of mortgage provision may therefore be warranted; possible options are canvassed in the 
penultimate section.  
 
Ring-Fencing 
Conceptually, ring-IHQFLQJ PD\ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV ³legally deconstructing a firm in order to more 
optimally reallocate and reduce risk.´137 In the context of banks, functionally ring-fencing serves three 
GLVFUHWH SXUSRVHV WR KHOS D EDQN RSHUDWH RQ D VWDQGDORQH EDVLV WR SUHVHUYH D EDQN¶V EXVLQHVV DQG
DVVHWVDQGWROLPLWDEDQN¶s risky activities and investments.138 As discussed in the introduction, since 
the GFC, some jurisdictions have moved to forcibly separate the retail and investment components of 
resident universal banks. In the U.K., a version of separation was recommended by the Independent 
Commission on Banking (ICB)139 and enacted under the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013.140 Full compliance is required by the beginning of 2019.141  
Whilst the Act stopped short of full separation and allows affected banks to remain part of the 
VDPHFRUSRUDWHJURXSLWUHTXLUHV³WKHULQJ-IHQFLQJRIµFRUH¶UHWDLOGHSRVLWVIURPµH[FOXGHG¶ZKROHVDOH
DQG LQYHVWPHQW EDQNLQJ DFWLYLWLHV´142 In effect, any bank which accepts deposits and/or provides 
overdrafts to individuals and SMEs as part of its general business will be a ring-fenced bank (RFB). 
These provisions apply to entities with more than £25 billion in deposits. The legislation restricts the 
form of asset that RFBs ZLOOEHDEOHWRKROGWKURXJKDµ3URKLELWLRQ2UGHU¶DQGSURVFULEes a number 
of activities (through DQ µ([FOXGHG $FWLYLWLHV 2UGHU¶143 specifically, dealing in investments as 
principal, except in circumstances specified by the Treasury144 and dealing in commodities.145 RFBs 
are permitted to deal in securities and derivatives for limited risk management purposes (for example, 
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hedging)146 and issue securitisations and covered bonds.147 They are however prohibited, save for 
some exceptions (transactions arising from the provision of trade finance and transactions and/or from 
the payments system), from having exposures to other financial institutions outside their own 
corporate group, including non-ring-fenced banks, investment firms, systemic insurance firms and 
investment funds.148 Amongst other things, these restrictions prevent RFBs from using wholesale 
finance for funding. RFBs are also prohibited from having any ownership rights or hold any capital 
LQVWUXPHQWVLQDQµH[FOXGHGDFWLYLW\HQWLW\¶($(VVXEMHFWWRH[FHSWLRQVGHWDLOed by the PRA).149 
7KHVWDWHGSXEOLFDLPRI WKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWV LV WR³UHDFKDSRVLWLRQ LQZKLFKDIDLOLQJEDQN
whatever side of the ring-fence it may be, can be resolved without risk to financial stability or to 
SXEOLF IXQGV´150 In particular, the ring-fence LV GHHPHG GHVLUDEOH EHFDXVH ³>D@ JXDUDQWHH ZKHWKHU
implicit or explicit, distorts incentives of managers and creditors, encouraging them to pursue 
excessive risk and leverage [and] distorts competition, and the allocation of resources, away from 
smaller EDQNV WR WKRVH ODUJH HQRXJK WR EH UHJDUGHGDV V\VWHPLF´151 The legislation recognises that 
because banks perform critical utility functions, parts of their operations must be preserved in the 
event of insolvency; however, the conditions under which the state/taxpayer will be permitted to 
support essential parts of the relevant institution have been constrained to a bare minimum. No 
support for non-ring-fenced entities will be offered by the state/taxpayer in the event of their distress. 
The deposit-guarantee system will continue for deposit-taking institutions, as will lender-of-last-resort 
facilities. RFBs must comply with prudential requirements on a standalone basis as well as any related 
entities (excluding EAEs); a so-called RFB sub-group. This is designed to ensure RFBs have 
sufficient resources to meet capital requirements associated with the risks of its RFB sub-group 
without relying on other group entities outside the sub-group, in particular EAEs. Intra-group 
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exposures between RFBs (and its subgroup) and the EAEs are regarded equivalently to third party 
exposures in the context of risk and capital. 
 
Likely Consequences of the ring-fence 
As enunciated, the main benefit of ring-fencing is a reduction in the potential for contagion between 
the retail and investment arms of financial institutions. This in turn, in theory will reduce market panic 
in the event of the insolvency or financial distress of a non-RFB. A further benefit is the fact that ring-
fencing results in modularity which, in some circumstances strengthens systemic resilience.152 In the 
case of the financial system, which is characterised by high complexity, reforming its constituent parts 
to make them less interconnected and less opaque may reduce the adverse consequences from failure 
in one part of the system. Decoupling institutions comprising the system by ring-fencing certain 
systemically important banks from the riskiest activities of other institutions in theory therefore 
protects that system.153 
Yet, there are also likely to be significant financial stability costs attached to ring-fencing, 
even to modularity. In particular, the lack of diversification opportunities available to RFBs presents 
significant concerns, as the likely result is a homogenised banking system, populated by institutions 
with few economies of scope, holding extremely similar asset portfolios. Moreover, because capital to 
fund lending will be more scarce by virtue of the separation, banks will need to manoeuvre their 
balance sheets to focus on products which are not resource-intensive. In the U.K., this is highly likely 
to result in RFBs concentrating to an even greater degree on mortgage lending154; as I have noted, 
SME lending and consumer lending require large capital and liquidity commitments in comparison to 
retail mortgage exposures ± even under internal risk modelling.  
With prescriptive prohibitions placed on the sort of investments that retail banks may make, 
senior executives in these institutions will accordingly have little choice in portfolio assembly. Faced 
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with a choice of investing in risky, capital-intensive lending and mortgage assets with much lower 
aggregate capital requirements, it is to be expected that management of RFBs will have strong 
incentives to favour the latter: RFBs are likely to have narrow opportunities to increase return-on-
equity, and booming housing markets provide avenues for investment which shareholders and 
managers of RFBs will find extremely difficult to resist.155 Moreover, the incentives for additional 
lending to capture profits will be extremely significant in RFBs, which are limited in their investment 
scope. Another alternative may be to take greater risks in relation to activities which are placed inside 
the fence, including mortgages.156 Other options for RFBs include commercial property lending; yet 
this is ³>K@LVWRULFDOO\WKHPRVWSHULORXVSDUWIRUEDQNVRIWKHSURSHUW\PDUNHW´157 and the ring-fencing 
legislation does nothing to distinguish this from residential property finance.  
Accordingly, in the case of the U.K., as noted earlier, the most likely consequence is that the 
largest banks come to act as little more than monolines focused almost exclusively on mortgage 
lending. The capacity of banks to securitise mortgage exposures under the SR will allow banks to lend 
in greater volumes to property markets, thanks to the aforementioned capital and liquidity benefits 
generated by securitisation.158 Moreover, if all large banks are exposed to the property cycle, the 
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system will arguably become even more prone to systemic collapse.  Indeed, the UK has experienced 
comparatively more volatile housing cycles than any other advanced nation159; this makes it likely that 
RFBs will be heavily exposed to future crises with little way of hedging their exposures. The 
following section provides new data on current trends in the U.K. housing and mortgage markets and 
explains how the spectre of ring-fencing has appeared to accentuate recent trends in retail mortgage 
lending, which has increased as a share of bank asset portfolios. These trends are arguably indicative 
of future developments, particularly in light of the SR. 
The UK Housing & Mortgage Markets 
Following deep price drops following the GFC, house prices in the UK have rebounded considerably 
and in some regions now stand at record levels. Arguably the most significant factor in this recovery 
has been that the supply of mortgages has remained sufficiently strong ± despite the banking crisis ± 
to prevent concerted and widespread drops in values. Mortgage supply has been maintained largely 
through the actions of the UK monetary authorities, including the setting (and maintenance) of 
historically low interest rates, and government-sponsored mortgage guarantee programmes.160  
Currently, the four largest financial institutions in the UK account for between 70 and 80% of 
the retail banking market, depending upon the measure used.161 Admittedly, in relation to mortgage 
financing, the picture currently LVOHVVFRQFHQWUDWHG7KH8.¶VODUJHVWEDQks accounted for 55% of all 
new mortgage lending in 2015, although they accounted for 60% of all outstanding mortgage 
assets.162 Total mortgage assets at UK banks (including lending for commercial real estate) comprise 
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approximately 79% of bank balance sheets.163 This concentration of lending has been part of a wider 
trend in bank lending which started in the mid-1980s, as displayed in the following chart: 
 
INSERT CHART 1 HERE 
 
A good proportion of the aggregate balance sheet evolution is consistent with lower credit origination 
to businesses. Between 2009 and 2012, for example, net loans to businesses from UK banks dropped 
by 3.9% in 2009, 2.1% in 2010, 0.8% in 2011, and 1.5% in 2012164 resulting in a significant 
compound drop in commercial bank loans. The SR of course is supposed to assist banks in providing 
finance to SMEs and other companies but, as I have explained, mortgage lending is generally more 
attractive to them. Further, SME loan securitisations are simply not attractive to investors; without 
demand, it is unlikely that banks will increase supply. SME loan securitisation in the US, for example, 
is virtually non-existent, despite securitisation markets being much less stigmatised and more active 
than in the UK and EU.165 
As demonstrated in the following charts, the trend for mortgage lending is clear, with lending 
increasing year-on-year since the GFC. As shown in Chart 2, gross lending volumes continue to 
increase. Chart 3 shows that net monthly mortgage lending is now approaching levels seen in 2002, 
                                                          
163
 Adair Turner, Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance (Princeton Univeristy 
Press 2016) 63. 
164
 Data from Bank oI(QJODQGµ7UHQGVLQ/HQGLQJ¶ 2009-2012. 
165
 $FFRUGLQJ WR'DUYDV³6HFXULWLVDWLRQRI 60( ORDQVDQGWKHLU SODFHPHQW ZLWK SULYDWH  LQYHVWRUVFDQ
KHOSRIIORDG«ORDQVIURPEDQNEDODQFHVKHHWV WKHUHE\SURYLGLQJURRPIRU more lending. But this market  is  
not functioning  at  the  moment:  while  securitisation  of  SME  loans  is  already  reasonably widespread in 
Italy and Spain, but almost none of the recent securitisations were placed with market investors; instead, they 
were retained by the originator banks and  used  for  repo  refinancing  with  the  ECB.  Most  likely,  the 
risk/return/liquidity  characteristics of such securities are not attUDFWLYH WR LQYHVWRUV´6HH='DUYDV µBanking 
system soundness is the key to more SME financing¶ European Parliament Directorate General for Internal 
Policies Policy Department A: Economic And Scientific Policy (July 2013) 6. 
44 
 
which marked the beginning of the previous mortgage boom; indeed, in 2016 it approached the 
highest levels since 2008.166 
 
INSERT CHART 2 HERE 
 
INSERT CHART 3 HERE 
 
If the view that banks are positioning their activities in a way to cope with the ring-fence, and in 
particular increased significance of mortgage lending, one would expect to find that mortgage 
issuance as a proportion of their aggregated activities would increase.  Indeed, it seems that mortgage 
origination is becoming steadily more important to banks as a proportion of their gross lending 
levels. The following chart shows WKDWODUJH8.EDQNV¶PRUWJDJHERRNVare steadily becoming larger 
as a proportion of total bank balance sheets with a clear trend emerging between 2007 and 2016.167 
Only Lloyds BG appears to have bucked the trend in this chart, although the recent drop in the share 
of mortgages on its books may be explained by the sale of the TSB brand, which was heavily 
concentrated in mortgages168: 
 
INSERT CHART 4 HERE 
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The charts above demonstrate that underlying bank lending, both at individual banks and at the 
systemic level appears to be trending towards greater gross lending into the mortgage markets, even 
before mandatory ring-fencing, or liberalisation of the securitisation markets via the STS label.169 This 
is a trend which ring-fencing retail banks and allowing them to securitise its assets is likely to 
exacerbate. What makes things worse in the case of the UK is that housing stock in is quite inelastic 
and thus unable to push prices down through substantially increased supply. Therefore, the pressing 
question of the day is whether regulation could avert any looming financial stability risk, taking also 
into account the state and composition of demand in the real estate market, and impending structural 
changes in the banking system. The next section surveys possible regulatory options. 
 
6. Macroprudential Regulatory Instruments and Housing Markets: The UK Approach 
 
Having analysed the lending trends above, I now turn to the instruments available to regulators to 
address them. Tackling mortgage growth was traditionally achieved through interest rate policy. 
However, ultra-loose monetary policy has blunted its effectiveness. Moreover, in the case of 
securitisation, as it increases the spectrum of funding sources, interest rate changes are not as effective 
on the lending activities of banks which securitise significant proportions of their loans. The interest-
rate tool may therefore be ineffective on constraining lending, especially in housing markets.170 
Accordingly, many regulatory authorities now rely on various macroprudential policies µPDFURSUX¶ 
instead. 
Real estate markets are of course often at the epicentre of financial stability shocks and in this 
context, macropru is designed with the principal aim of limiting the damage caused by mortgage 
defaults. This may be achieved through three main channeOV ORZHULQJ OHQGHUV¶ ORVVHV LQcreasing 
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EDQNV¶ FDSLWDO ex ante so they may withstand losses from mortgage defaults; and preventing busts 
from quickly morphing into booms by limiting the effects of policies designed to support house prices 
following a bust from contributing to excessive price rises in the future.171 The specific measures used 
to achieve this usually take the form of: (i) higher bank capital and liquidity ratios applied to banks; 
and (ii) limits on loan-to-value and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios in mortgage loans. For reasons which 
shall now be explained, relying on the latter basket of mechanisms ± particularly LTV limits ± 
arguably holds the most promise for reducing the incidence and magnitude of real estate bubbles. The 
use of macroprudential measures in combination is also more effective than employment of a single 
tool.172 Perhaps surprisingly, LTV limits are currently the only measure which has not yet been 
adopted in the UK by the central bank as a macroprudential instrument. Yet, in light of the SR 
proposal, further measures may be required in the UK if new RFBs do, as is likely, evolve to become 
almost exclusively focused on mortgage lending. 
 
(i) Capital & Liquidity Regulation 
 
Increasing bank capital requirements and introducing binding liquidity ratios have been at the 
forefront of global initiatives to make the financial system more resilient to shocks. The UK adheres 
to the recommendations of the Basel Committee, and remains bound by European legislation, 
particularly CRD IV. Higher capital requirements make bank failures less likely by requiring a capital 
buffer to absorb losses, and make runs less likely by reducing the reliance of the bank on deposit 
financing. In turn, liquidity restrictions force banks to hold a relatively high proportion of liquid assets 
and prevent them from relying on wholesale finance (something which RFBs will be prevented from 
doing in any case).  
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There is not space in this article for an exhaustive discussion of bank capital and liquidity 
regulation, although it is instructive to highlight some of their inherent weaknesses in targeting 
mortgage lending. The limitations of capital and liquidity regulations are well-known, particularly the 
procyclicality of such measures. In the early stages of economic expansion, virtually all assets pay off 
DQGEDQNV DUH DEOH WRERRNFDSLWDO JDLQVEDVHGRQ WRGD\¶VKLJKDVVHWSULFHV ,Q FRQWUDVW GXULQJD
downturn banks will be forced to securitise mortgages to a greater extent in order to comply with 
capital regulations and in the process, exacerbate the fire sale loop. On this basis, capital regulation, 
based on risk-weighting, is highly procyclical. Thus, it is unclear to what extent increased capital 
ratios would act as a risk restraint in the case of securitised lending.173 The extent to which capital 
regulations may be gamed by large financial institutions also remains a concern,174 especially as 
tinkering with mortgage risk-weights does little to dampen credit and house-price growth.175 
Moreover, whilst counterparty exposure limits are included in revisions to Basel III, in calculating 
default risk, the risk weighting system does not take into account the fact that institutions may be 
exposed to an entire market ± such as the housing market ± in determining capital requirements. Not 
punishing portfolio invariance is therefore a very important concern when bank lending is 
concentrated without breaching large exposure limits, and may become even more concerning once 
ring-fencing is introduced.176  
As with capital regulation, there are issues with liquidity ratios, which are very procyclical. If, 
in bad times, liquidity regulation becomes binding banks will aim to securitise even more of their 
assets (being more liquid), which will add to any firesales in a downturn. Thus, where a liquidity ratio 
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is binding in a good state where asset values are high, it would become even more binding in a bad 
state when asset values have dropped. Counterintuitively therefore securitisation increases liquidity 
risk.   
 
(ii) Loan-to-value, loan-to-income and debt-to-income limits 
Because of the limits of capital and liquidity regulations, particularly in targeting mortgage lending 
growth without creating distortions elsewhere, authorities could choose instead to use LTV limits or 
LTI/DTI ratios in order to contain mortgage credit expansion; international evidence points to strong 
effects from targeted housing instruments on mortgage growth and house price rises.177 Many 
countries now use LTV and LTI/DTI ratios either in isolation or in combination.178 LTV ratios are 
akin to leverage restrictions, which limit the amount of debt a borrower may assume for an asset 
purchase.179 These limits guard against both unexpected shocks to income and interest rates, and the 
underestimation of the severity of tail risks. Limits on high LTV lending reduce potential losses in net 
worth for households for a given fall in nominal house prices.180 In terms of the banking channel, 
lower LTV ratios force mortgage borrowers to absorb a greater slice of the losses from a real estate 
YDOXH FROODSVH VR WKDW EDQNV¶ GHIDXOWV DUH PXFK ORZHU WKDQ DEVHQW WKH /79 UHVWULFWLRQ Moreover, 
they slow mortgage growth by requiring that house purchases are funded with equity (which requires 
building), rather than through credit. Looser credit terms, as noted above, are a hallmark of house 
price bubbles. Amongst advanced economies, LTV limits have been used with significant success in 
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moderating housing booms.181 IMF research shows that LTV ratios slow mortgage credit growth by 
0.8 percent and house price inflation by 1.9 percent.182  
LTI limits restrict borrowers from obtaining mortgages which exceed a given multiple of their 
income. DTI limits on loans prevent borrowers from obtaining mortgages under which repayments 
exceed a given amount of their income per month. In this way, DTIs target households, rather than 
lenders. However, DTI limits are more susceptible to gaming than LTI, because by lengthening a 
mortgage terms, monthly repayments may drop substantially.183 This not only allows higher lending 
WR WDNHSODFHEXWDOVR LQFUHDVHV WKHPDWXULW\PLVPDWFKEHWZHHQEDQNV¶IXQGLQJDQG OHQGLQJJLYLQJ
rise to liquidity risks. Despite this, the IMF finds that DTI limits may be potent tools with which to 
moderate mortgage markets, with DTI limits restricting mortgage credit growth by 1.4 percent and 
house price inflation by 1.8 percent.184 Accordingly, DTI limits are almost as effective as LTV limits 
in slowing house prices.185 
Ex ante LTV limits in combination with LTI/DTI limits therefore appear to hold considerable 
promise for reducing the incidence of housing bubbles which, as noted, are the greatest threat to 
financial stability and economic growth.186 These tools may, of course, also be useful in tackling the 
self-reinforcing feedback effects in housing markets, referred to earlier in the article, where valuation 
increases induce higher supply and demand for credit, which themselves trigger further value 
increases. Expectations of future price increases are key mechanisms of this channel. Where LTV or 
LTI limits constrain mortgage lending in the upswing of the cycle, this is likely to affect expectations 
concerning future house prices and increasing the potency of the macroprudential tools. Because the 
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housing wealth of mortgage borrowers increases by more than a one-to-one basis as house prices 
rise187 loose mortgage finance term can allow house prices to move away significantly from income 
relations over the medium-term. LTV and LTIs can be effective in moderating these amplification 
risks. House prices may also be affected by equity withdrawals, which are facilitated even where 
incomes do not change provided lenders expect future house price increases.188  
In the UK, the Bank of England has recommended the implementation of LTI and DTI 
limits,189 largely in response to data in 2014 which suggested that mortgage underwriting standards 
were loosening.190 Under the %DQN¶V provisions, high loan-to-income mortgages (designated at loans 
which equal or exceed 4½ times borrower income) at large UK mortgage originators191 may not 
comprise more than 15% of their mortgage books over two consecutive quarters.192 The Bank also 
imposes DTI affordability checks on borrowers, requirLQJ OHQGHUV WR DVVHVV ERUURZHU¶V DGGLWLRQDO
credit commitments and other regular payments, as well as the LTI obligation under the mortgage 
contract, in assessing a mortgage. In contrast, whilst the Bank of England has consulted on LTV limits 
and has powers to use them, it has not implemented them.193 This is perhaps curious given the 
empirical evidence on their effectiveness, and on the susceptibility of high-LTV mortgages to default. 
Many countries have used LTV limits successfully in order to control real estate lending booms.194 In 
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objectives. See Prudential Regulation Authority, ,PSOHPHQWLQJ WKH )LQDQFLDO 3ROLF\ &RPPLWWHH¶V
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191
 Lenders who issue less than £100 million of mortgages per month or less than 300 mortgage contracts per 
month are excluded. 
192
 PRA 2014/24, PRA Rulebook: Housing Instrument 2014. Some buy-to-let restrictions were also introduced; 
VHH 35$ µ8QGHUZULWLQJ VWDQGDUGV IRU EX\-to-OHW PRUWJDJH FRQWUDFWV¶ Supervisory Statement SS13/16 
(September 2016). 
193
 ,QIDFWRQHRIWKH8.¶VODUJHVWPRUWJDJHOHQGHUVLQUHLQWURGXFHGSHUFHQW/79PRUWJDges for the 
first time since the GFC. See E Dunkley µ%DUFOD\VODXQFKHVILUVWPRUWJDJHVVLQFHFULVLV¶)LQDQFLDO7LPHV
May 4 2016 <https://www.ft.com/content/4ff23b54-113f-11e6-839f-2922947098f0> 
194
 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, 129 (2011). 
51 
 
the UK, high LTV mortgages have much higher default rates than those with lower LTVs, with a one 
percentage point increase in LTV leading to a one percent increase in the probability of default.195 
Loans with LTVs of 90% or above are four times more likely to be in arrears than those below, and 
high LTVs are a strong predictor of mortgage default.196  In contrast, data from the UK shows LTI 
ratios are not a strong or consistent predictor of default,197 which is consistent with findings from the 
U.S. market.198 
7KHVHUHVXOWVLQGLFDWHWKDWSODFLQJGLUHFWOLPLWVRQEDQNV¶FDSDFLW\WROHQGIRUPRUWJDJHVDQG
ERUURZHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR REWDLQ ILQDQFLQJ DUH WKH RSWLPDO ZD\V WR UHGXFH WKH HURVLRQ RI PRUWJDJH
underwriting standards characteristic of mortgage finance booms. In turn, this ought to reduce the 
frequency and size of real estate bubbles. As noted above, the procyclicality of capital and liquidity 
regulation ± despite the new tools afforded to regulators to counteract credit booms ± may not 
overcome the collective over-optimism which normally accompanies housing booms. Further, in light 
of the arbitrage opportunities presented by the SR, discussed above, invoking LTV ratios in the UK 
may become a pressing requirement. 
 
(iii) Restrictions on Mortgage Securitisations? 
Perhaps the obvious question based on the above analysis, and in view of both the imminent 
rejuvenation of securitisation markets and bank activity restrictions, is whether in implementing the 
proposed securitisation regulation in the UK, additional restrictions on the MBS market are warranted. 
As I have noted in this article, so-FDOOHG³ULVN\´OHQGLQJPD\QRWEHWKHPDLQGULYHURIKRXVLQJERRPV
and subsequent busts; rather higher aggregate lending, which is not always reflective of poor 
underwriting, may emerge even in prime mortgage loan markets. Because of this, targeting the 
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characteristics of bank mortgage loan assets ± such as LTVs and DTIs ± may not always constrain 
excessive lending, particularly as home prices may fall much further than anticipated when banks 
issue ³QRQ-KLJKULVN´ORDQV199  
Restrictions on securitisation may therefore add to the effectiveness of macropru in limiting 
the incidence(s) of housing bubbles. If housing booms are driven as much by expectations as 
fundamentals, limiting the width of the lending channel is a crucial undertaking. The range of 
potential restrictions is wide, but each has limitations and trade-offs. Workable solutions might be to 
place restrictions on the form of mortgage assets which individual banks are permitted to securitise. 
One solution for example PLJKWEHWRDOORZRQO\µVWDQGDUGLVHG¶PRUWJDJHVWREHVHFXULWLVHGLHZKHUH
the mortgages to comprise the securitisation pool comply with some pre-determined criteria.200 
Because complexity and information gaps in the securitisation process were blamed for creating 
incentives for poor underwriting, closing these gaps through standardisation would reduce the 
incentives to originate mortgage loans of lower quality. By proxy, this would to an extent standardise 
the MBS constructed from the underlying assets. This would in turn help in reducing heterogeneity 
and complexity, informational asymmetries between lenders and investors, and provide improved 
regulatory discipline. In particular, it would close the arbitrage loophole referred to earlier. In this 
vein, a workable alternative might be to prohibit the securitisation of high-risk mortgages ± at LTV 
ratios of less than the 100% currently permitted ± in order to disincentivise banks from issuing them 
in the first place.201  
Yet, these solutions would not address the problems associated with mortgage markets 
identified in this article. Indeed, the same critique as that levelled at the investor-protection moral-
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hazard driven perspective may be applied. Each proceeds from a parallel position to mandatory risk 
retention requirements under the SR; that is, provided incentives to originate lower-quality mortgages 
are restricted, and proper information is provided to investors and to regulators to allow them to make 
informed choices, poor quality mortgages will not be securitised (or at least the volumes reduced), 
making the possibility of a housing bubble more remote. Alternatively, provided end-investors are 
themselves less-leveraged, negative externalities from mortgage defaults may be contained and 
financial stability preserved. But as explained, housing bubbles are driven by common optimistic 
expectations amongst buyers of properties and their creditors. Because of the behavioural tendencies 
amongst all parties when it comes to real estate markets, this excessive lending is possible with or 
without restrictions on the composition of securitisations. In fact, given that the main contribution of 
securitisation to housing bubbles is its capacity to widen the lending channel ± which as noted will 
become more significant in an era of RFBs ± constraining securitisation volumes is likely to be more 
appropriate in containing future risks. The basic purposes of securitisation, as noted earlier, are to 
broaden funding sources and to economise on capital, each of which facilitates higher lending 
volumes. 
 Constraining these channels therefore assumes fundamental importance. For these reasons, 
restricting securitisation of mortgage loans is likely to be needed as part of any regulatory response to 
future developments in the MBS market. On this basis, the SR could be amended in the UK context to 
VWLSXODWH WKDW RQO\ ORDQV WR 60(V DQG RWKHU ³SURGXFWLYH´ ORDQV FRXOG EH WKH VXEMHFW RI 676
securitisations, thereby placing an outright ban on STS MBS. Whilst draconian, there is justification 
for this form of restriction from the Commission itself. The professed aim of the Capital Markets 
8QLRQLV WR³EHWWHUOLQNVDYLQJVZLWKJURZWKDQGSURYLGHPRUHRSWLRQVDQGEHWWHUUHWXUQVIRUVDYHUV
DQGLQYHVWRUV«RIIHUEXVinesses more funding choices at different stages of their development and to 
channel investment to where it can be used most productively, increasing the opportunities for 
(XURSH
VFRPSDQLHVDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWV´202 Elsewhere ± in the Capital Markets Union Action 
Plan ± WKH&RPPLVVLRQDUJXHV WKDW WKH65ZRXOG ³>U@evitalise simple, transparent and standardised 
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European securitisations to free up capacity on  banks'  balance  sheets  and  provide  access  to  
investment  opportunities  for  long  term iQYHVWRUV´203 No mention of mortgage lending is made by 
the Commission in either document.  
On the other hand, restricting securitisation entirely to SME-linked loans in itself may result 
in undesirable indirect effects. The main counter-argument ± that allowing banks to securitise 
mortgages will free up balance sheet space for greater credit origination to businesses ± is, in theory, 
solid. Preventing RFBs from securitising mortgages will further constrict lending, with the likely 
result of reduced credit to SMEs. Conversely, of course, preventing RFBs from securitising mortgages 
will leave them even more exposed to the housing cycle, as they are unable to shift any risks from 
their balance sheets from real estate-related assets. Whilst there are significant benefits to be realised 
for the real economy from increased lending for production, it would be deeply unfortunate to restrict 
the securitisation of mortgage lending simply to achieve this end, particularly if it resulted in a 
banking system comprised of homogenous, undiversified institutions almost entirely exposed to the 
housing market.204 
For these reasons, a solution which permits securitisation of mortgages, but prevents the 
VHFXULWLVDWLRQRIPRUHWKDQDFHUWDLQSURSRUWLRQRIDEDQN¶VSRUWIROLR, might be favourable. This will 
mitigate the effects of the introduction of the SR on mortgage markets and still provide incentives for 
RFBs to issue non-real estate loans which will benefit from more risk-sensitive capital treatment. 
Giving a rough estimate to the question of what would be the appropriate level of assets eligible for 
securitisation is beyond the capacity of a mere lawyer. But there are at least two guiding principles 
which might inform this regulation:  
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(i) The first relates to balance: there must be an appropriate balance struck in any move to 
restrict the securitisation of mortgages between MBS and securitisation of other forms of 
loan. If the SR is to have any benefit, banks must be able to securitise some proportion of 
their mortgage loans. As banks are likely to concentrate lending on property markets, 
securitisation must be permitted to an extent to prevent them from becoming overexposed 
to real estate values. Securitisation of mortgages is not undesirable per se. As noted 
above, by freeing up balance sheet space, the capacity to issue MBS may allow banks to 
issue more loans for productive activities. But as I have also discussed, securitisation is 
also likely to augment the mortgage lending channel. Allowing lending levels to 
appreciate significantly in a market likely to become saturated by the activities of RFBs 
risks putting further pressure on housing prices. One response might be to replace 
maximum thresholds for MBS issuance as a proportion of total asset securitisation, with a 
requirement that for a proportion of MBS issued, a given proportion of loan assets must 
be comprised of loans to SMEs. The inherent tradeoff in a stipulation such as this is that 
mortgage risks might become concentrated on bank balance sheets if demand for SME 
loans is low, increasing systemic fragility. Placing maximum thresholds on mortgage 
securitisation levels is therefore likely to be preferable. A simple implementation 
mechanism would be to provide that, beyond a certain threshold, preferential capital 
treatment for bank-originated STS would no longer be applicable. This would provide an 
additional disincentive for banks to issue mortgage assets and thereby place a constraint 
on the flow of finance to real estate markets.205 
 
(ii) Second, the regulation of the MBS market must be dynamic: any regulation of the MBS 
market cannot be static, and any restrictions on securitisation must be subject to 
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adjustment based on the judgment of regulators, based on economic conditions. Given the 
appropriate systems (which are, indeed already in place in the UK in relation to the 
housing market) regulators ought to be prepared to intervene where appropriate. The main 
dilemma for regulators in relation to housing bubbles is of course, that they are 
sometimes difficult to spot, and regulators may therefore be forced to substitute their own 
judgment(s) for that of the market. Yet, there are other areas of regulators are provided 
discretionary tools when certain indicators flash and warnings are triggered. Analogous 
examples include the discretionary powers granted to regulators under Basel III to 
increase bank capital requirements through the cycle via the counter-cyclical buffer206 or 
in the UK, for a variable leverage ratio.207 Affording regulators discretion over these tools 
is not without limitations; regulators are themselves anything but immune to collective 
the over-optimism or disaster myopia behavioural tendencies discussed previously.208 
However, it is also clear that central banks and financial regulators engage in much 
improved data collection and dissemination since the GFC which, whilst imperfect, allow 
financial regulators to make more informed decisions concerning appropriate 
constraints.209 Further, as discussed above, the tools available to regulators to specifically 
monitor housing markets are also more refined. 
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7. Conclusion 
This article has challenged the standard narrative concerning the interaction between securitisation, 
real estate bubbles and financial stability. The existing literature on the topic of securitisation is 
process-focused, concentrating on the problematic of incentives in the securitisation process. The 
literature which adopts this view holds that the principal focus of regulators ought to be investor 
protection, through ensuring that incentives for poor loan origination are minimised. To achieve this, 
greater information disclosure and transparency, and reduced complexity, are recommended. A 
consequence of this analytical framework is that efficient credit allocation decisions are made, and the 
likelihood of securitisation-induced fragility is reduced. 
In contrast, I have argued that the main danger posed by the securitisation process is its 
contribution to widening the lending channel, particularly in the context of real estate lending. 
Housing bubbles are generated largely through over-optimistic expectations of future house price 
growth. In the past, securitisation has contributed to these bubbles by acting as a mechanism allowing 
banks to increase credit origination. This credit origination inflated real estate values to levels which 
were not justified by underlying economic fundamentals. The contribution of securitisation was not 
decisive in this process, but it played a large role by removing capital constraints and loosening 
EDQNV¶OHQGLQJFDSDFLW\ 
Potential remedies to this issue vary. Existing macroprudential policies are likely to be 
effective to a point in containing future housing bubbles. Yet, the structural reforms taking place in 
the U.K, most notably ring-fencing, is likely to result in several very large monoline mortgage 
lenders. Whilst allowing these institutions to securitise their assets to diversify away the risks from 
mortgage lending is vital, regulators must also be cognisant of the capacity of securitisation to 
contribute to excessive lending, a facet of securitised banking which is likely to become more acute in 
the presence of RFBs. Re-introducing mortgage loan securitisation must therefore be approached with 
caution, particularly in the UK. Restricting mortgage securitisation levels may be appropriate in the 
interests of financial stability. 
